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ABSTRACT—A major shift is transforming the trade and environment field, 
triggered by governments’ rising use of industrial policies to spark nascent 
renewable energy industries and to restrict exports of certain minerals in 
the face of political economy constraints. While economically distorting, 
these policies do produce significant economic and environmental benefits. 
At the same time, they often violate World Trade Organization (WTO) 
rules, leading to increasingly harsh conflicts between trading partners. 
This Article presents a comprehensive analysis of these emerging 
conflicts, arguing that they represent a sharp break from past trade and 
environment disputes. It examines the causes of the shift and the nature of 
the industrial policies at issue. The ascendance of these Next Generation 
conflicts transforms both the international and domestic political 
economies of trade litigation and environmental policy. It raises 
implications for the choice of forum for trade litigation, the divide between 
industrialized and developing countries’ strategic interests, the stability of 
domestic political alliances, and the availability of WTO legal exceptions 
for environmental measures. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the most worrisome implication of Next 
Generation cases for both environmental protection and trade liberalization 
arises from often-overlooked trade remedy laws. The choice of litigation 
forum matters greatly because the compliance options differ depending on 
the forum. As a result, the environmentally harmful consequences of Next 
Generation cases are likely to be greater in domestic trade remedies cases 
than in WTO dispute settlement cases. To mitigate the environmental 
harms from Next Generation cases and reduce the threat of a green trade 
war, this Article suggests that we focus on reforming domestic trade 
remedies rules. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Conflict between international trade and environmental protection is 
once again on the rise. After a decade of tranquility, major trading powers 
are aggressively challenging each other’s pro-environmental policies in the 
name of global trade rules. Indeed, 2012 proved to be the most contentious 
year ever, with more conflicts looming on the horizon. 
In March 2012, the United States, EU, and Japan joined forces to 
challenge China at the World Trade Organization (WTO) over China’s 
export restrictions on rare earth minerals, enacted allegedly for 
environmental reasons.1 Two weeks later, a WTO panel heard oral 
arguments in a case brought by Japan and the EU over Ontario’s feed-in 
tariffs for renewable energy.2 In May 2012, the U.S. slapped punitive tariffs 
 
1 Alan Beattie et al., Fight Against China on Rare Earths, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2012, 6:34 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4c3da294-6cc2-11e1-bd0c-00144feab49a.html#axzz2if0z1fA4. 
2 Shamsiah Ali-Oettinger, WTO Hearing: Canada Defends Its FITs, PV MAG. (Mar. 30, 2012), 
http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/wto-hearing--canada-defends-its-fits_100006288/#a
xzz2o28QMlSl. 
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on Chinese solar panels up to 250%, denouncing Chinese manufacturers for 
unfairly dumping their goods into the American market.3 China, in turn, 
attacked U.S. states’ rebates for renewable energy installations.4 By 
September 2012, the EU had opened its own investigation into unfair 
practices of China’s solar panel manufacturers.5 Weeks later, China 
responded by filing its own WTO case against the European feed-in tariffs 
for violating WTO rules.6 The year ended with a WTO panel finding 
Ontario’s feed-in tariff illegal.7 This list is but a sampling of the growing 
conflicts.8 As we shall see, 2013 has proven to be equally contentious, with 
several important WTO rulings and confrontations over tariffs imposed on 
renewable energy goods.9 
Deep tension between the competing goals of global governance 
regimes—encouragement of national environmental policies versus 
removal of protectionist trade barriers—is not new. The last time trade and 
environment conflicts were at a similar state of high alert was the mid-
1990s, when the United States imposed environmental conditions on 
imports of tuna and shrimp, and developing countries successfully 
challenged these regulations as illegal under international trade law. The 
recent cases, however, represent a dramatic departure from past conflicts. 
They are driven by the rapid rise of green industrial policies—the 
application of traditional industrial policy instruments to spur the 
development of renewable energy and environmentally friendly industries. 
Indeed, the policies underlying the recent disputes have more in 
common with recent industrial policy measures in the steel, automobile, 
and semiconductor sectors than they do with the import measures on tuna 
and shrimp in the environmental disputes of the recent past. Despite this 
difference, however, these industrial policies have as large, if not larger, 
 
3 Ehren Goossens et al., U.S. Solar Tariffs on Chinese Cells May Boost Prices, BLOOMBERG (May 
18, 2012, 3:56 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-17/u-s-solar-tariffs-on-chinese-cells-
may-boost-prices.html. 
4 James T. Areddy & Wayne Ma, Beijing Flares Up at U.S. on Solar Tariff, WALL ST. J., May 25, 
2012, at B3. 
5 Keith Bradsher, Europe to Investigate Chinese Exports of Solar Panels, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 
2012, at B3. 
6 Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain Member States—Certain 
Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WT/DS452/1 (Nov. 7, 2012). 
7 Panel Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, 
Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, §§ VIII.A.1, VIII.B.1, WT/DS412/R, 
WT/DS426/R (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Canada-Renewable Energy Panel Report]. 
8 Other disputes include commencement of trade remedies cases by the United States in January 
2012 against Chinese and Vietnamese wind turbines, by China in June 2012 against American and 
South Korean polysilicon producers, and by India in November 2012 against Chinese, American, 
Malaysian, and Taiwanese manufacturers of solar modules. In addition, a dispute of what we label the 
“Classic” variety also occurred between the EU and others over the EU’s proposed aviation emissions 
trading scheme. More details about each of these cases will be discussed later in the Article. 
9 See infra Part II.C. 
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impacts on the environment, because they concern dirty production and the 
renewable technologies held out as necessary to combat climate change. 
And like the industrial policies of the past, they too are giving rise to 
contentious trade disputes because they flout established trade norms of 
nondiscrimination and “fair” pricing. This is giving rise to a set of what we 
call “Next Generation” trade and environment conflicts. This Article 
examines how Next Generation conflicts significantly raise the stakes for a 
trade war and will dominate the trade and environment discourse for the 
coming decade. We believe that they force a profound reevaluation of our 
assumptions about trade and environment disputes in four key ways: 
First, the geopolitical dynamics of trade and environment conflicts are 
becoming more complex. Developed and developing countries alike are 
embracing green industrial policies that run up against and, in some cases, 
clearly conflict with trade disciplines. The earlier cases of the 1990s 
presented a simple North–South divide. In “Classic” trade and environment 
disputes such as Tuna/Dolphin10 and Shrimp/Turtle,11 developed countries 
used border-access measures to improve the environmental behavior of 
developing-country trading partners. Today, though, the North–South 
divide of the earlier era has disappeared. Both developed and developing 
countries are adopting green industrial policy tactics that benefit the 
environment but upset trade rules. 
Second, these conflicts are radically reconfiguring the domestic 
political economy surrounding trade and environment policymaking. The 
temporary “green–blue” alliance of convenience—composed of labor, 
domestic industry, and environmental groups—that emerged in past trade 
and environment disputes risks disintegrating as a result of the Next 
Generation cases. Labor unions are now leading the charge against foreign 
green industrial policies, while domestic industries are split depending on 
their position in the supply chain. Interestingly, most environmental groups 
have refused to engage, greeting the recent spate of litigation with near 
deafening silence—a dramatic shift from their earlier activism. 
Third, the scope of the applicable law is expanding, with major 
implications for how adjudicators should balance competing trade and 
environmental interests. The Classic cases relied on General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XX exceptions and an implicit balancing 
test between the sovereign right of governments to protect the environment 
against the need to avoid protectionist policies hindering trade.12 The green 
industrial policies challenged in Next Generation cases, by contrast, 
 
10 Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT 
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report]. 
11 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle AB Report]. 
12 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
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involve local-content requirements, conditional subsidies, tax rebates, and 
artificial limits on inputs. None of the disciplines governing these trade 
measures involves a balancing test. So long as there is a prima facie 
violation of a trade obligation, the environmental policy must be 
eliminated. This is true no matter the size of the environmental harm 
addressed or the environmental benefit of the measures. In addition, 
judicial rulings in Next Generation cases have made clear that some 
countries—in particular, China—possess less room to implement measures 
to protect the environment than others, having bargained it away as the 
price for joining the WTO. 
Finally, the forum choices for litigation are also expanding. Prior 
disputes were litigated solely through multilateral dispute settlement (i.e., 
the GATT and its successor, the WTO), but this is no longer the case. Next 
Generation conflicts, unlike their predecessors, are increasingly being 
litigated through domestic administrative proceedings, known as trade 
remedies cases. The result is that countries are now taking unilateral legal 
action against their competitors’ green industrial policies, increasing the 
odds of a green trade war. 
The impact of these profound shifts is not well understood and has 
received scant scholarly consideration to date. On the surface, it appears 
that the values of the trade regime—emphasizing nondiscrimination, trade 
liberalization and flexibility to counteract “dumping” of goods at unfair 
prices—are triumphing over the value of global environmental protection. 
Already, WTO rulings have outlawed local-content requirements on 
Canadian feed-in tariffs and Chinese export restrictions on raw materials—
purportedly enacted for environmental reasons—because of their 
protectionist impact.13 Domestic administrative rulings in the United States 
have levied higher tariffs on cheap solar panels and wind turbines from 
China, raising the cost and slowing the pace of solar installations in the 
United States. The EU also has imposed tariffs on Chinese solar panel 
producers that refuse to limit their exports and sell above a certain 
minimum price. China, meanwhile, has imposed similar tariffs against 
foreign renewable energy products, and India may soon follow as well. 
Indeed, the few scholars following these cases have called for reform of the 
laws implicated by environmental disputes at the WTO so as to mitigate 
environmental harm, though political economy constraints make this 
unlikely.14 
 
13 Canada-Renewable Energy Panel Report, supra note 7; Appellate Body Report, China—
Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, 
WT/DS398/AB/R (Jan. 30, 2012) [hereinafter China-Raw Materials AB Report]. 
14 See, e.g., Luca Rubini, Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, the SCM 
Agreement, Policy Space, and Law Reform, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 525 (2012); Aaron Cosbey, Renewable 
Energy Subsidies and the WTO: The Wrong Law and the Wrong Venue, SUBSIDY WATCH (Global 
Subsidies Initiative, Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switz.), June 2011, at 1. 
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We advance a counterintuitive argument. While trade interests will 
almost always triumph over environmental interests in Next Generation 
cases, we demonstrate that the practical damage to environmental priorities 
from WTO cases will often be much less than feared. Unlike the import 
measures at issue in the Classic cases, but like many other industrial policy 
measures, the legally problematic element of a Next Generation measure 
can be severed from the rest of the policy without sacrificing the 
environmental benefits altogether. Furthermore, in many instances, 
loopholes in WTO law allow the losing party to continue advancing 
elements of the green industrial policy—albeit in a different and potentially 
more costly, but WTO-compliant, mode. Therefore, the urgency to amend 
WTO rules may not be as great as some contend. 
The real point of worry arising from the growing volume of Next 
Generation conflicts is the group of trade remedies cases brought through 
domestic administrative proceedings. Because these trade disputes are 
brought against companies and not governments, the options for 
postjudgment compliance differ. As we will demonstrate, all of a 
company’s compliance options are likely to trigger a loss in environmental 
welfare. Consequently, the environmental harm from trade remedies cases 
is likely to be much greater than that from WTO cases. 
Complicating this situation further is the fact that a choice of forum is 
not necessarily available in all instances. Instead, the available forum or 
fora depend on the facts of the case. As a result, the desired solution is not 
as simple as channeling cases away from domestic trade remedies 
proceedings and toward WTO litigation. The latter may be foreclosed in 
certain instances. 
All this suggests that the existing calls to reform trade law to 
accommodate Next Generation environmental concerns have been 
misdirected. Rather than advocating reforms of WTO law, as the few 
scholars focused on this area have proposed, we contend that both 
environmentalists and fair trade advocates would be better served by 
narrowly amending domestic trade remedies regulations to prevent a 
harmful green trade war. Our arguments, therefore, are both descriptive and 
prescriptive. 
Part I sets forth the Classic model of a trade and environment dispute, 
describing the significant cases of the 1990s and the common features of 
these conflicts. We do not argue that the Classic model is disappearing 
altogether. Indeed, it continues to resonate in proposals to address climate 
change through border measures. Importantly, though, Classic disputes are 
no longer the only game in town, nor even the dominant one. 
Part II examines the rise of green industrial policies around the globe. 
Describing the causes for their growth, we present a framework for 
understanding the different types of instruments used to promote green 
industrial policy, such as subsidies and export restrictions. We identify the 
trade law issues raised by such policies, giving rise to a series of Next 
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Generation cases. Finally, we highlight the two different fora through 
which litigation of such disputes can be pursued—at the WTO or through 
domestic courts—and the details of the cases to date. 
Whether measured numerically or by impact, the Next Generation 
disputes already comprise the lion’s share of trade and environment 
litigation over the past five years. Part III analyzes the implications of this 
shift. Juxtaposing the Next Generation cases against the Classic cases, we 
explore the four major developments noted above. These cases are: 
(1) eroding the North–South divide of the Classic cases and complicating 
geopolitical dynamics, (2) reshaping the domestic political economy by 
threatening alliances among interest groups, (3) upending the balancing 
mechanism found in prior jurisprudence by implicating new treaty 
provisions, and (4) driving adjudication outside the WTO to domestic 
administrative courts. Taken together, they are leading to rulings less 
favorable to environmental interests. 
In Part IV, we make a prescriptive argument, contending that 
individuals interested in reforming trade law to accommodate 
environmental interests should place greater emphasis on reforming trade 
remedy laws for conflicts adjudicated at the domestic level. This includes 
introducing limits on trade remedies for environmental goods (in terms of 
quantity, timing, and/or scope) and rebating tariff revenue to consumers to 
offset higher costs. Such reform proposals have been all but neglected to 
date. 
In short, a profound shift is under way in the field of trade and 
environment disputes. This Article explores the rise of Next Generation 
conflicts, proposes a framework for thinking about them, explains why this 
matters, and sets out a new vision of what we should be doing about it. 
I. THE CLASSIC VIEW OF TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT DISPUTES 
A. The Conventional Beliefs Arising out of the Classic Cases 
The trade and environment debate first emerged more than two 
decades ago, when a series of disputes highlighted the tension between the 
competing goals of trade liberalization and environmental regulation. These 
initial conflicts shared a common narrative: rich developed countries, often 
the United States, enacted domestic environmental measures such as 
protecting dolphins in the tuna fishery or reformulating for cleaner burning 
gasoline. These countries worried, however, that the new regulations would 
place their domestic producers at a competitive disadvantage if their 
trading partners did not adopt similar requirements. To ensure a level 
playing field, the measures included restrictions banning imported products 
that did not meet similar environmental criteria. Market access served as a 
carrot to improve environmental practices. 
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In reaction, poor exporting countries denounced these restrictions as a 
neocolonial stick, a protectionist barrier to keep their economies down. 
They attacked the restrictions as illegal under trade law and challenged the 
environmental conditions before the GATT and its successor, the WTO. 
This dynamic was repeated in the three most important trade and 
environment cases of the 1990s: Tuna/Dolphin, Shrimp/Tuna, and U.S.-
Gasoline.15 
Tuna/Dolphin addressed the use of purse-seine nets for tuna fishing.16 
These nets often ensnared and drowned hundreds of thousands of dolphins 
that swam above the tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. The U.S. had 
banned the use of such nets for its domestic fleet, but most countries 
continued the practice. In 1988, Congress amended the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act, requiring that any country exporting tuna to the U.S. certify 
that its fleet was not causing greater dolphin mortality than the U.S. fleet.17 
The new law effectively banned tuna from any country using purse-seine 
nets as well as from all other intermediary countries that imported tuna 
from the uncertified country. Mexico challenged the law before the GATT 
as illegal discrimination.18 
  
 
15 To be clear, environmental concerns have surfaced in other WTO cases besides these three 
Classic cases. Yet, in many of these “related” cases, a major motivation behind the ban was the negative 
impact on health, with the environment serving as a secondary argument. For example, in the 2003–
2006 dispute, EC-Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (also known as the “Genetically 
Modified Organisms” (GMO) case), several countries challenged the European Communities’ (EC) 
general moratorium on the approval of genetically modified food products. One of the reasons given by 
the EC to justify its moratorium was the need for precaution because of the uncertain impact the 
introduction of GMOs would have on the environment. A primary driving force behind the EC’s 
precautionary principle was not environmental protection, however, but concerns over human and 
animal health. See Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) (adopted 
Nov. 21, 2006). A similar concern over health was at the heart of the EC-Asbestos dispute concerning a 
French decree banning the import and sale of asbestos fibers. See Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶¶ 2, 168, 
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). Similarly, the Brazil-Retreaded Tyres dispute of 2005–2008 was 
focused primarily on health concerns, even though Brazil also raised points about the environmental 
impact of tire imports. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded 
Tyres, ¶¶ 119, 129, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007). 
16 Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶¶ 2.1–2.9. 
17 Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-711, § 4, 102 Stat. 4755, 
4765 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1423h (2012)). The MMPA states that “[t]he 
Secretary of the Treasury shall ban the importation of commercial fish or products from fish which have 
been caught with commercial fishing technology which results in the incidental kill or incidental serious 
injury of ocean mammals in excess of United States standards.” 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (2006). 
18 Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶¶ 1.1, 3.1. 
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The Shrimp/Turtle dispute followed a similar fact pattern.19 Trawlers 
fishing for shrimp were inadvertently catching and drowning endangered 
sea turtles. Congress mandated that American shrimp boats equip their 
trawling gear with “turtle excluder devices” (TEDs) that allow turtles to 
escape. Many countries’ fleets did not adopt TEDs and, to level the playing 
field and strengthen global protections for sea turtles, the U.S. Congress 
passed an amendment to the Endangered Species Act in 1989 banning 
imports of shrimp from countries that could not certify that their shrimp 
fisheries did not threaten endangered sea turtles.20 In practice, this meant 
that foreign shrimp producers needed to prove their fleets were using 
TEDs. India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand brought suit, challenging 
the U.S. ban for violating trade rules.21 
A similar issue arose in U.S.-Gasoline.22 In 1994, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued the Gasoline Rule, aimed 
at reducing vehicle emissions of toxic air pollutants and ozone-forming 
volatile organic compounds.23 The Rule mandated that all gasoline sold in 
the United States needed to conform to minimum “cleanliness” 
requirements as defined from a historic 1990 baseline.24 Most American 
refineries were allowed to use an individualized 1990 baseline, but most 
foreign producers were required to meet a general statutory baseline based 
on the average quality of U.S. gasoline in 1990, regardless of their own 
particular situation.25 Developing countries protested this difference as 
discriminatory, with Brazil and Venezuela leading the charge.26 
 
19 Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
¶¶ 2.4–2.14, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle Panel Report]; Shrimp/Turtle AB 
Report, supra note 11, § I. 
20 This U.S. amendment is referred to as Section 609. Sea Turtle Conservation Amendments to the 
Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609, 103 Stat. 988, 1037 (1989) (amending 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1537). 
21 Shrimp/Turtle Panel Report, supra note 19, ¶¶ 2.7, 3.1. 
22 Panel Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, ¶¶ 2.5–
2.7, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996); Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, § I.B, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.-Gasoline AB 
Report]. 
23 Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
59 Fed. Reg. 7716, 7716 (proposed Feb. 16, 1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80). 
24 Id. at 7716–17. No refinery was permitted to sell gasoline anywhere in the U.S. that was “dirtier” 
than the 1990 baseline. In addition, no refinery was allowed in certain urban areas unless it reduced 
emissions of particular pollutants by at least 15% against the 1990 baseline. Id. at 7716–17, 7851–52, 
7856–57. 
25 U.S.-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 22. The Gasoline Rule sorted all gasoline refineries into 
one of two categories. Those in the first category were permitted to define their 1990 baseline on an 
individualized basis using refinery-specific quality data. Those in the second category were obliged to 
use a statutory baseline for their 1990 baseline, meaning that their baseline was based on the average 
quality of gasoline sold in the U.S. by all producers in 1990. To sort a refinery into one category or the 
other, the EPA considered various criteria which differed depending on whether the refinery was 
domestic or foreign. Id. This led to more American refineries being able to use an individualized 
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In all three cases, the GATT/WTO ruled in favor of the developing-
country complainants.27 Despite differences in their process and production 
methods, adjudicators found that the products were “like” goods under 
international trade law and in breach of the nondiscrimination obligation of 
GATT Articles I and/or III.28 In turn, the U.S. tried to assert the defenses 
available under GATT Article XX.29 Article XX(b) provides an exception 
for trade restrictions “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health,”30 while Article XX(g) provides an exception for measures “relating 
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”31 
In evaluating a defense, an adjudicator engages in a two-part analysis. 
First, she determines whether the policy truly serves the substantive 
purpose being claimed—does it genuinely relate to conservation of an 
exhaustible resource or is it truly necessary to protect human life? If so, 
then the adjudicator must examine whether the measure nevertheless acts 
as “a disguised restriction on international trade” or was implemented in a 
discriminatory manner.32 This two-step evaluation is often referred to as a 
balancing test, weighing the legitimacy of the environmental policy 
challenged against its potential negative impact on trade.33 In all three 
cases, adjudicators found that the United States did not qualify for the 
Article XX defenses.34 
The decisions in these so-called Classic cases were hugely influential, 
seizing the attention of both the environmental and academic communities, 
 
baseline than foreign refineries. In May 1994, the EPA proposed to amend the Gasoline Rule so that the 
criteria used to determine whether a foreign refinery could use an individualized baseline would be 
made similar to the criteria employed for domestic refineries. However, this proposal was ignored by 
Congress, which enacted legislation in September 1994 denying the EPA funding to implement its May 
1994 proposal. Id. 
26 Id. at 1. 
27 Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶ 7.1; Shrimp/Turtle AB Report, supra note 11, 
§ VII; U.S.-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 22, § V. 
28 Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶ 5.9; Shrimp/Turtle AB Report, supra note 11, 
§ VI.C.2, ¶ 23; U.S.-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 22, §§ I.C, III.C. GATT Article I, which enshrines 
the most-favored-nation treatment principle, prohibits WTO members from discriminating between 
their trading partners with respect to “like” products. GATT, supra note 12, art. I. Similarly, GATT 
Article III, which enshrines the national treatment principle, prohibits WTO members from 
discriminating between imported and domestically produced goods if they are “like” products with 
respect to fiscal charges, laws, and regulations. Id. art. III. 
29 Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶ 5.22; Shrimp/Turtle AB Report, supra note 11, 
§ II.A.2; U.S.-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 22, at 7, 21. 
30 GATT, supra note 12, art. XX(b). 
31 Id. art. XX(g). 
32 Id. art. XX. 
33 See ANDREW T. GUZMAN & JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 358–59, 367 
(2d ed. 2012); WTO Rules and Environmental Policies: GATT Exceptions, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_exceptions_e.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
34 Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶ 7.1(a); Shrimp/Turtle AB Report, supra note 11, 
§ VII; U.S.-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 22, § V. 
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and quite literally creating the field of trade and environment law. Within a 
remarkably short period, environmental groups hired trade lawyers and 
launched campaigns directed toward the threat that “GATTzilla” posed to 
the environment while a flood of scholarship assessed the uneasy 
relationship between environmental protection and trade protectionism.35 
The Classic cases were often portrayed in the United States as 
faceless, international bureaucrats obstructing the efforts of good, 
developed countries to protect the environment from bad, developing 
countries.36 Within developed countries, the import bans enjoyed 
widespread support among unlikely allies in the domestic political 
economy. Environmental and animal rights groups welcomed them as a 
way to gain leverage over otherwise recalcitrant foreign governments.37 
Antiglobalization groups resented the influence of international 
organizations on national policy decisions.38 Domestic producers supported 
the restrictions because they leveled the playing field.39 And labor unions 
endorsed them because they helped keep jobs at home. No other policy 
issues aligned these disparate groups’ interests so closely, and the political 
alliance proved potent. During the 1999 WTO Ministerial (the so-called 
“Battle in Seattle”), hundreds of environmental and antiglobalization 
protesters dressed up as sea turtles, marching alongside members from the 
Teamsters and United Steelworkers.40 These public protests derailed the 
start of a new round of trade negotiations and threatened the public 
legitimacy of the young WTO institution, just four years old at the time. 
Despite the loud protests, an uneasy truce prevailed in the ensuing 
decade. While, on the surface, all three cases involved a loss for 
environmentalists, the jurisprudence quietly shifted. The Appellate Body’s 
 
35 See, e.g., DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT (1994); Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair 
Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 459, 524–25 (1994); Aaditya 
Mattoo & Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade, Environment and the WTO: The Dispute Settlement Practice 
Relating to Article XX of GATT, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 327 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997); Russell Norman, GATTzilla Versus 
Flipper, GREEN LEFT, Sept. 7, 1994, at 13, available at http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/8219. 
36 For example, the Earth Island Institute ran a full-page advertisement showing a sea turtle trapped 
in a fishing net with the headline in bold, “Why should we let a bunch of World Trade Organization 
bureaucrats determine the fate of our earth?” DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW AND POLICY 1241 (4th ed. 2011) (reproducing the advertisement). 
37 ELIZABETH R. DESOMBRE, DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: 
INDUSTRY, ENVIRONMENTALISTS, AND U.S. POWER 246 (2000). 
38 The Public Citizen website, for example, declares that “[h]istorically, the Venezuela Gas, Tuna-
Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle cases revealed a systemic bias in the WTO rules and the WTO dispute 
resolution process against the rights of sovereign states to enact and effectively enforce environmental 
laws.” WTO and Environment, Health & Safety, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/
ENVIRONMENT (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
39 DESOMBRE, supra note 37. 
40 Kit Oldham, WTO Meeting and Protests in Seattle (1999)—Part I, HISTORYLINK.ORG (Oct. 13, 
2009), http://www.historylink.org/index.cfm?displaypage=output.cfm&file_id=9183. 
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approach in Shrimp/Turtle represented a departure from the earlier cases, 
opening the door for countries to regulate trade to advance environmental 
protection.41 Additionally, the WTO publicly took steps to affirm that trade 
rules are not antithetical to environmental protection.42 Over time, 
environmental groups came to realize that the threat of trade law was not as 
dire as they had once feared.43 
Though trade and environment disputes largely faded into the 
background after 2000, the conventional assumptions of the Classic cases 
have persisted.44 Developed countries still consider themselves the leaders 
in advancing global environmental protection, at times resorting to tariffs 
and trade restrictions on imports to encourage developing countries seen as 
unwilling to do their share. Trade law is still suspected as favoring trade 
liberalization over environmental protection, limiting the ability of 
countries to regulate the environmental practices of their trading partners 
because of fears of protectionism. And GATT Article XX remains the 
arbiter, balancing environmental protection against trade protectionism 
when conflicts arise. 
B. The Resurgence of Classic Assumptions in the Climate Change Debate 
The Classic assumptions about trade and environment disputes have 
been reinforced in recent years by climate change policy debates. Those 
countries considering greenhouse gas reduction measures and carbon taxes 
have sought to ensure a level playing field with competitors who have no 
 
41 For anyone interested in understanding the change in approach further, see, for example, Steve 
Charnovitz, The WTO’s Environmental Progress, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 685, 695 (2007), which argues 
that “the generally well-thought-out Appellate Body decisions” in the Classic cases “inspired 
confidence in the adjudication process, and convinced many environmentalists that legitimate 
environmental measures would be permitted by the WTO”; Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings 
in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 491, 516 (2002), which argues that the Appellate Body’s Shrimp/Turtle jurisprudence “swept 
away almost all the pillars of the GATT anti-environmentalist edifice”; and John H. Knox, The Judicial 
Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and the Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 29–42 
(2004), which describes these cases as reinterpreting the GATT and leading to “the [g]reening of [t]rade 
[j]urisprudence.” 
42 See WORLD TRADE ORG., TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT AT THE WTO 6–7 (2004) (noting that 
while “the WTO is not an environmental protection agency,” WTO rules “provide significant scope for 
Members to adopt national environmental protection policies”). 
43 Telephone Interview with David Hunter, Professor of Law, Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law & 
Former Exec. Dir. of the Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law (May 2, 2012). 
44 The Tuna/Dolphin debate has persisted as well, now entering its third decade of dispute, most 
recently over U.S. regulations governing the use of a “dolphin-safe” label on tuna cans. Again, a 
developing country, Mexico, challenged the legality of the pro-environmental regulation, with the WTO 
again ruling in its favor. In May 2012, the Appellate Body (AB) held that although dolphin protection 
was a legitimate objective, the U.S. regulations are discriminatory and therefore illegal. Appellate Body 
Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products, ¶¶ 1–3, 342, 407–08, WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin AB 
Report]. 
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such policies and therefore lower production costs. In ongoing multilateral 
negotiations, for example, China and India have refused to adopt 
immediately binding commitments for greenhouse gas reductions, arguing 
that their developing-country status and need for economic growth rule out 
such measures.45 Frustrated, developed countries are considering and, in 
some cases, adopting unilateral measures to encourage carbon-reducing 
behavior by trading partners. The U.S. Congress convened hearings to 
examine what types of border restrictions could be adopted in conformity 
with WTO law,46 while the European Commission also held public 
consultations over its proposed regulations.47 Again, the same message is 
being delivered as in the Classic cases: if you want access to our markets 
for your products and services, then you need to take action or be subject to 
border measures. 
This time, the main tool has been a carbon emissions trading scheme 
(otherwise known as “cap and trade”). In the United States, such programs 
featured prominently in the failed 2009 Waxman–Markey bill.48 The 
legislation adopted by the House of Representatives contained a section 
requiring importers to purchase greenhouse gas allowances if the exporting 
country did not have a similar greenhouse gas reduction program in place.49 
Since 2005, the EU has implemented the Emissions Trading System 
(ETS). Each year, the European Commission establishes a “cap” on the 
total amount of carbon emissions allowed in a given industry and then 
apportions a finite number of tradeable emission allowances to companies 
within that industry.50 
 
45 John M. Broder, At Climate Talks, a Familiar Standoff Between U.S. and China, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 8, 2011, at A18; India Did Not Pledge to Legally Binding Commitments on Emissions: 
Government, JAGRAN POST (Dec. 17, 2011, 12:29 AM), http://post.jagran.com/india-did-not-pledge-to-
legally-binding-commitments-on-emissions-government-1324061976. 
46 Hearing on Trade Aspects of Climate Change Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. 8, 42, 50–52, 77, 81 (2009). 
47 For a list of public consultations that the European Commission held, including several 
concerning its ETS scheme, see Closed Consultations, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/consultations_en.htm#closed (last updated Dec. 20, 2013). 
48 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 701, 703 
[hereinafter Waxman–Markey]. See also the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-and-
trade initiative to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector by 10% in Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
Memorandum of Understanding, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/design/
history/mou (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
49 Waxman–Markey, supra note 48, § 722. 
50 At the end of the year, a company has to surrender enough allowances to cover its emissions or 
face heavy fines. Council Directive 2009/29, arts. 14, 16, 2009 O.J. (L 140) (EC); Council Directive 
2003/87, arts. 11, 14, 16, 2003 O.J. (L 275) (EC); Questions and Answers on the Revised EU Emissions 
Trading System, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/faq_en.htm (last updated 
Dec. 17, 2008). 
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In 2008, the European Parliament decided to extend the ETS to 
airlines’ greenhouse gas emissions for flights into Europe beginning in 
2012, requiring allowances for the carbon emitted during the entire flight, 
not simply over European airspace.51 Worried that the scheme would 
disadvantage European airlines, the EU extended it to include foreign 
airlines. Although the scheme involves emission allowances rather than a 
direct import ban or tariff, its spirit is similar to that of the border measures 
at issue in the earlier Classic disputes. The EU is leveraging its market 
power to compel behavioral change beyond its borders. If an airline wishes 
to fly into European airspace, then it must reduce its carbon emissions or 
incur a cost (through purchase of additional emissions allowances or 
payment of a fine to the Commission for exceeding its allowances). 
The EU’s trading partners responded with virulent protests. 
Developing countries led the charge. India threatened to ban EU airlines 
from Indian airspace as retaliation, with the country’s Aviation Minister 
warning, “Travelling is always a two-way traffic . . . . If they can impose 
sanctions so can other countries.”52 China’s state-run press similarly issued 
blunt warnings that developed countries should not risk a trade war over “a 
trade barrier in the name of environmental protection.”53 Already, China 
has ordered its airlines not to pay the emissions tax,54 with other countries 
following suit.55 Russia convened a meeting of opposing countries to 
consider eleven potential retaliatory measures against the EU.56 Together, 
they have persuaded more than twenty countries—including developed 
countries like the U.S. and Japan—to declare their opposition.57 In 
November 2012, the EU retreated, suspending the policy for a year.58 
 
51 Council Directive 2008/101, art. I, 2009 O.J. (L 8) (EC). 
52 Chetan Chauhan, India Gets Support of Basic Countries Against EU’s Carbon Tax, HINDUSTAN 
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2012, 9:20 PM), http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/India-gets-
support-of-Basic-countries-against-EU-s-carbon-tax/Article1-811467.aspx; James Fontanella-Khan et 
al., India Warns EU over Airline Carbon Tax, FIN. TIMES (May 24, 2012, 7:12  PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aceffc00-a58d-11e1-a77b-00144feabdc0.html (quoting Civil Aviation 
Minister Ajit Singh). 
53 Simon Rabinovitch, China Warns EU of Carbon Tax ‘Trade War,’ FIN. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2011, 
12:12 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/49ab64c8-2c92-11e1-aaf5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2fpDfx
2TM. 
54 Joshua Chaffin, China Creates Aviation Turbulence, FIN. TIMES (U.S. ed.), Feb. 7, 2012, at 5; 
Joe McDonald, China Bars Its Airlines from Paying EU Carbon Tax, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 6, 2012. 
55 For example, legislation was introduced in the U.S. Congress exempting U.S. airlines from 
paying the tax. See John Crawley, Congress to Oppose EU Law on Aircraft Emissions, REUTERS, Jan. 
31, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/01/us-usa-airlines-eu-idUSTRE81003Y
20120201. 
56 Pilita Clark, Alliance Fights EU Carbon Tax on Airlines, FIN. TIMES (U.S. ed.), Feb. 18, 2012, 
at 3. 
57 Joint Declaration of the Moscow Meeting on Inclusion of International Civil Aviation in the EU-
ETS, Feb. 22, 2012, http://www.greenaironline.com/photos/Moscow_Declaration.pdf. 
58 Joshua Chaffin & Andrew Parker, Brussels Freezes Airline Carbon Charge, FIN. TIMES (U.S. 
ed.), Nov. 13, 2012, at 2. 
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As with the earlier Classic cases, developed countries are employing 
unilateral measures to encourage more environmentally friendly behavior 
in exchange for market access. These measures to address global 
environmental problems are denounced by trading partners as illegal under 
international trade law.59 The Classic form of a trade and environment 
dispute, and the assumptions that follow from them, remain alive and well. 
The problem, though, is that Classic disputes are no longer the only, or 
even the most important, game in town. 
II. THE RISE OF GREEN INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
As both the European aviation dispute and the latest chapter of the 
Tuna/Dolphin case60 make clear, the Classic form of trade and environment 
disputes continues to remain relevant. But we contend that this dominant 
narrative has become outdated. Another strand of conflicts has emerged in 
the past five years—the aggressive promotion by both developing and 
developed countries of industrial policies with environmental benefits and 
protectionist results. This development lies at the heart of what we call the 
Next Generation of trade and environment disputes. Since 2008, green 
industrial policies have already given rise to twelve significant trade and 
environment conflicts.61 
As we shall discuss, the Next Generation cases give rise to profoundly 
different legal and policy implications than the Classic cases. Countries, 
along with environmental groups, face an uncomfortable choice: should 
they be willing to sacrifice certain free trade principles in exchange for 
increased environmental action? Or should such principles prevail even if 
they slow efforts to tackle environmental problems? Part II discusses the 
causes underlying the rise of green industrial policies, the tactics employed 
in such policies, and the trade conflicts they have spawned. 
A. Why Have Green Industrial Policies Emerged? 
Industrial policy, as Dani Rodrik proclaimed in 2010, is back.62 Out of 
favor for many years in the shadow of “free market” acolytes, industrial 
policy is the principle that governments should actively and intentionally 
intervene to encourage the development of key domestic manufacturing 
 
59 For a discussion of trade-related concerns, see, for example, LORAND BARTELS, THE INCLUSION 
OF AVIATION IN THE EU ETS: WTO LAW CONSIDERATIONS 8–27 (Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable 
Dev. Issue Paper No. 6, 2012); Joshua Meltzer, Climate Change and Trade—The EU Aviation Directive 
and the WTO, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 111, 123–56 (2012). Note that although the dispute shares the 
attributes of a Classic case, the underlying treaty (i.e., the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS)) is different because the dispute concerns a service rather than a good. 
60 See Tuna/Dolphin AB Report, supra note 44. 
61 See infra Part II.C. 
62 Dani Rodrik, The Return of Industrial Policy, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Apr. 12, 2010), 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-return-of-industrial-policy. 
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sectors. The use of industrial policy is, of course, not new. But most 
recently, it has taken on a decidedly “green” tinge. Governments are 
applying industrial policy strategies in renewable energy and extractive 
resource industries. As a result, the industrial policy issues that played out 
in earlier trade conflicts in semiconductors and automobiles are now 
working their way into trade and environment disputes. 
The primary factors driving the fusion of environmental and industrial 
policy domains have been political economy pressures, technological 
change, and concerns over energy security. Thanks to decades of research, 
technological advances have lowered the cost of renewable energy sources 
and made their adoption less cost prohibitive.63 At the same time, 
governments are finding it harder to justify spending to support renewable 
energy policies on environmental grounds alone. In an era of rising fiscal 
austerity, the question of “what’s in it for us” takes on greater political 
salience in every debate over public spending. 
To justify spending on environmental policies, governments 
increasingly need to ensure some payoff for their constituencies. In order to 
gain public support, governments are embedding spending on renewable 
energy projects within an overarching industrial policy designed to create 
high-paying “green-collar” jobs.64 In addition, governments are 
emphasizing the fact that such programs are good for national security 
because they reduce dependence on foreign sources of energy.65 This too 
raises the importance of ensuring that the manufacturing to support the 
renewable energy sector remains local. 
For developing economies, such as China and India, an industrial 
policy targeting renewable energy carries an additional benefit—the 
opportunity to move up the value chain and gain market leadership in 
emerging manufacturing sectors.66 Of the seven strategic industries targeted 
in China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan (FYP), three involve renewable 
 
63 Felix Mormann & Dan Reicher, Op-Ed., How to Make Renewable Energy Competitive, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/02/opinion/how-to-make-renewable-energy-
competitive.html?pagewanted=all. 
64 See, e.g., The Right Honourable David Cameron, Speech at the Sustainable Consumption 
Institute Conference: The Green Consumer Revolution (Oct. 16, 2009) (noting “the importance of 
individual governments showing leadership” and emphasizing the creation of 70,000 jobs while 
advancing environmental goals). 
65 Claudette Roulo, Clean Energy Tied to National Security, Official Says, DEFENSE.GOV (Feb. 7, 
2013), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119237 (noting the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs’ remarks “that the motivation for seeking out clean 
energy sources is strongly rooted in national security interests”). 
66 China, for example, has adopted an automobile-emissions standard that is stricter than the United 
States’. This may stem from concerns over local pollution or, additionally, be the result of an export 
strategy for domestically manufactured vehicles that can be sold directly on the European market and 
satisfy their stringent emissions requirements. David Green, Experts Say Beijing’s New Auto Emissions 
Standards to Ripple Through China, WARDSAUTO (Feb. 21, 2013), http://wardsauto.com/asia-pacific/
experts-say-beijing-s-new-auto-emissions-standards-ripple-through-china. 
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energy.67 India’s Eleventh FYP included a comprehensive program to 
bolster capabilities in solar, wind, biomass, hydropower, and energy 
storage.68 Recently, India’s Planning Commission announced that spending 
targeted at renewable energy would further increase in the Twelfth FYP.69 
While, at least temporarily, the words “industrial policy” and 
“renewable energy” may trigger negative associations in the American 
public’s mind after the Solyndra fiasco, within academic and policy circles, 
resistance to industrial policy is eroding.70 There is a growing recognition 
that industrial policy, when executed well under certain circumstances, can 
be effective.71 Germany’s success to date in creating renewable sector jobs 
and manufacturing leadership through an active industrial policy, in 
particular, has attracted much attention from others intent on replicating the 
recipe for its success.72 Governments worldwide are keen to grow their 
economies while implementing green policies—even if it requires their 
active intervention. 
B. How Is Green Industrial Policy Being Deployed? 
No one-size-fits-all formula exists for sparking the growth of key 
strategic industries. The strategies vary, depending on the sector and actors 
involved, but they draw on a basic set of policy tools. In this section, we set 
out the major instruments applied in green industrial policies—some 
 
67 These are: (1) the “[e]nergy conservation and environmental protection industries,” (2) “new 
energy” industries (e.g., wind, solar, biomass, etc.), and (3) “new-energy” automobiles. THE TWELFTH 
FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA (2011–2015) pt. III, ch. 10 (English Section of the Cent. Document Translation Dep’t of the 
Cent. Compilation & Translation Bureau trans., 2011). 
68 GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP 
ON NEW AND RENEWABLE ENERGY FOR THE XITH FIVE YEAR PLAN (2007–12) (2006). 
69 Increasing Productivity Is Aim of 12th Plan: Srivastava, TIMES INDIA (Dec. 8, 2012, 10:58 PM), 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-12-08/guwahati/35688793_1_12th-plan-renewable-
energy-productivity. 
70 Solyndra is an American solar panel manufacturer. The company received over $500 million in 
loan guarantees from the U.S. Department of Energy before filing for bankruptcy in 2011. It has been 
held out by some as an example of why the government should not support start-up renewable energy 
companies. See Ronald D. White, Solar Firm to Cease Operations, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2011, at B2. 
71 See, e.g., Ann Harrison & Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, Trade, Foreign Investment, and Industrial 
Policy for Developing Countries, in 5 HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 4039 (Dani Rodrik & 
Mark R. Rosenzweig eds., 2010). The World Bank’s former chief economist has himself endorsed 
industrial policy as playing a key role in transforming economies, but noted that such efforts must be 
properly aligned with a country’s resource base and factor endowments. Justin Yifu Lin, Industrial 
Policy Comes Out of the Cold, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.project-syndicate.org/
commentary/industrial-policy-comes-out-of-the-cold. For an endorsement specific toward addressing 
environmental issues, see Philippe Aghion et al., The Environment and Directed Technical Change 
(GRASP Working Paper No. 21, 2011). 
72 See, e.g., Priya Barua et al., Delivering on the Clean Energy Economy: The Role of Policy in 
Developing Successful Domestic Solar and Wind Industries (World Res. Inst. Working Paper, 2012), 
available at http://pdf.wri.org/delivering_clean_energy_economy.pdf. 
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targeting nascent renewable energy sectors directly, others drawing on 
quasi-environmental policies to advantage key high-tech industries. We 
also explore the constraints imposed by WTO law on each particular form 
of industrial policy. 
1. Sector-Targeted Subsidies.—The most common, and blunt, form 
of industrial policy is a general subsidy provided to the targeted sector. For 
green industrial policy, three types of targeted subsidies are common. The 
first is general research and development subsidies to firms, universities, 
and other institutions engaged in renewable energy research. The second is 
financial subsidies, such as low-interest or guaranteed loans, equity 
infusions, and tax credits, given directly to firms. The third is feed-in-tariff 
(FIT) programs. A FIT refers generally to a series of policies taken to 
provide a long-term financial incentive for generation of renewable energy. 
For example, one version of a FIT is to provide a guaranteed price for 
renewable energy supplied to the grid through a long-term contract; the 
price is almost always higher than the prevailing market price for energy 
supplied from nonrenewable sources. This guarantee helps to offset the 
higher costs faced by renewable energy producers. By eliminating this cost 
disadvantage, the hope is that a FIT will spur greater investment and 
innovation in renewable energy.73 
Green energy subsidies have grown rapidly in recent years, from $39 
billion in 2007 to $66 billion in 2010.74 The International Energy Agency 
(IEA) projects them to grow to almost $250 billion by 2035.75 More than 
half of the world’s renewable energy subsidies are supplied by EU 
countries, with the EU and the United States collectively accounting for 
80% of all renewable energy subsidies in 2010.76 Other countries actively 
deploying major subsidies for renewable energy industries include Japan, 
Canada, and South Korea.77 Additionally, over sixty-five countries employ 
a FIT for renewable energy.78 These include several EU member states, 
Canada, Japan, Australia, Israel, and numerous U.S. states.79 Overall, the 
FIT approaches taken by European countries have been among the most 
 
73 For a short overview, see, e.g., JULIE TAYLOR, FEED-IN TARIFFS (FIT): FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS FOR STATE UTILITY COMMISSIONS (2010). For a more extensive discussion of the design 
and financing of feed-in-tariff programs, see WILSON RICKERSON ET AL., UNITED NATIONS ENV’T 
PROGRAMME, FEED-IN-TARIFFS AS A POLICY INSTRUMENT FOR PROMOTING RENEWABLE ENERGIES 
AND GREEN ECONOMIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2012). 
74 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011, at 508, 530 (2011). 
75 Id. at 530–31. 
76 Id. at 530. 
77 See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, GLOBAL CLEAN POWER: A $2.3 TRILLION OPPORTUNITY 46, 60, 
68 (2010). 
78 REN21, RENEWABLES 2012 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 14 (2012). 
79 Id. at 14, 118 tbl.R12. 
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varied and effective.80 Germany’s program, in particular, has attracted 
much positive attention, transforming Germany into an export leader for 
environmental goods.81 
While the bulk of subsidies are provided by advanced economies, 
China and India are also significant players. China’s Golden Sun program 
subsidizes up to 70% of the installation cost for off-grid solar and up to 
50% of the installation, transmission, and distribution costs of a grid-
connected solar array.82 Initiated in 2009, the program covers almost 300 
solar projects worth nearly $3 billion.83 In addition, China provides 
subsidies through FIT programs for wind energy and biomass electricity.84 
In 2011, India announced that it had provided $51 million in subsidies, up 
63% from the previous year.85 India’s FIT programs subsidize solar, 
biomass-electricity, hydropower, and wind energy projects.86 According to 
IEA projections, China will be the third largest provider of renewable 
energy subsidies by 2015, and India will be the fourth largest by 2025, if 
not sooner.87 Collectively, they will account for at least 20% of global 
subsidies.88 
Undoubtedly, subsidy programs have played a key role in spurring the 
growth of renewable energy industries, with positive benefits spilling over 
beyond national borders. The diminishing cost of solar and wind power 
worldwide is due, in part, to aggressive Chinese subsidies that have 
triggered a supply glut and price war.89 Consumers around the globe are 
enjoying cheaper clean energy, often thanks to industrial policies 
elsewhere.90 
 
80 See, e.g., ARNE KLEIN ET AL., EVALUATION OF DIFFERENT FEED-IN TARIFF DESIGN OPTIONS—
BEST PRACTICE PAPER FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FEED-IN COOPERATION (3d ed. 2010). 
81 Mark Landler, Solar Valley Rises in an Overcast Land, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at C1. For 
more details, see FED. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, NATURE CONSERVATION & NUCLEAR SAFETY, 
REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMY 2011, at 17–19 (Peter Franz et al. eds., 2011). 
82 Eric Martinot & Li Junfeng, Renewable Energy Policy Update for China, 
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (July 21, 2010), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/
print/article/2010/07/renewable-energy-policy-update-for-china. 
83 Ucilia Wang, Here Comes China’s $3B, ‘Golden Sun’ Projects, GREENTECH SOLAR (Nov. 16, 
2009), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/here-comes-chinas-3b-golden-sun-projects. 
84 See Martinot & Junfeng, supra note 82. 
85 Clean Energy Subsidies Swell in India, CLIMATE GROUP (Sept. 5, 2011), http://www.theclimate
group.org/what-we-do/news-and-blogs/clean-energy-subsidies-swell-in-india/. 
86 Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Tariff Determination 
from Renewable Energy Sources) Regulations, 2009, Gazette of India, section III(4), at 50–51 (Sept. 
16, 2009). 
87 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 74, at 531 fig. 1413. 
88 Id. 
89 Keith Bradsher, Strategy of Solar Dominance Now Poses a Threat to China, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 
2012, at B1. 
90 Christopher Martin, U.S. Solar Projects Rose 67 Percent in Fourth Quarter, SEIA Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 14, 2012, 3:52 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-14/u-s-solar-
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While some form of government intervention may be necessary in the 
face of market failure, in practice, subsidy policies can reflect rent seeking 
by domestic industries. As a result, WTO rules place constraints on the use 
of subsidies, but do not ban them outright. The rules governing subsidies 
are set out in a separate agreement, outside of the GATT, known as the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).91 
The SCM Agreement only disciplines subsidies that specifically target 
certain enterprises or apply specific criteria.92 If such subsidies are 
contingent upon export performance or local-content requirements, they are 
impermissible.93 Otherwise, they fall into the broad category of 
“actionable” subsidies in WTO parlance. 
These “actionable” subsidies are permissible under WTO law so long 
as they do not negatively harm the trade interests of other countries. A 
government may petition to declare another government’s subsidy illegal if 
it can demonstrate that the subsidy has “adverse effects to the interests of 
other [WTO] Members.”94 It may also take unilateral actions in domestic 
administrative courts against another government’s subsidy if it finds that 
“the effect of the [actionable subsidy] is such as to cause or threaten 
material injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to prevent 
or materially retard the establishment of a domestic industry.”95 
In addition, subsidies may enable a producer to sell at a lower price 
than would otherwise be the case. WTO law also includes the possibility 
 
projects-rose-67-percent-in-fourth-quarter-seia-says.html; Ian Steadman, European Solar Power 
Capacity Keeps Increasing Despite Subsidy Cuts, WIRED UK (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.wired.co.uk/
news/archive/2012-09/25/solar-power-austria-europe. 
91 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM 
Agreement]. A subsidy is defined under WTO law as “a financial contribution by a government or any 
public body” that confers a “benefit.” Id. art. 1.1. The term “financial contribution” encompasses most 
forms of what are typically considered to be subsidies, such as grants, loans, equity infusions, tax 
credits, loan guarantees, etc. Four specific categories of “financial contribution” are elaborated upon in 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(i)–(iv) of the SCM Agreement. Any such financial contribution confers a “benefit” 
whenever it is given “on terms more favourable than those available to the recipient in the market.” 
Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 157, 
WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999). In addition, case law has clarified that the term “public body” covers 
any “entity that possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority.” Appellate Body Report, 
United States—Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 
¶ 317, WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011). 
92 The SCM Agreement explicitly states that its rules only apply to subsidies that are “specific.” 
Three types of subsidies are automatically deemed specific: export subsidies, local-content subsidies, 
and subsidies “limited to certain enterprises located within a designated geographical region within the 
jurisdiction of the granting authority.” See SCM Agreement, supra note 91, arts. 1.2, 2.2–2.3 & 3. The 
criteria for considering specificity of other forms of subsidies outside of these three types are spelled 
out in Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement. See id. art. 2.1. 
93 See id. art. 3. 
94 Id. art. 5. Three examples of “adverse effects” are spelled out in the SCM Agreement. See id. 
95 GATT, supra note 12, art. VI:5. 
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for unilateral action in domestic administrative courts when the price is so 
low that the exporter is considered to be “dumping” its product into a 
market.96 Again, a petitioner must demonstrate that the dumped goods 
“cause or threaten material injury.”97 Petitions seeking relief from 
actionable subsidies and dumping may be filed simultaneously. 
These avenues for litigation, as we shall see, have opened the door to 
several trade remedies cases filed against producers subsidized through 
green industrial policies. What began as a trade spat over green subsidies 
between the United States and China spilled over in 2012 to encompass a 
much wider range of countries, including the EU, India, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, and Vietnam.98 
2. Conditional Local-Content Subsidies and Policies.—A second 
instrument that has featured prominently in green industrial policy is the 
local-content subsidy, defined under WTO law as a subsidy “contingent . . . 
upon the use of domestic over imported goods.”99 In the green industrial 
policy context, the subsidy may take the form of a rebate to consumers of 
renewable energy products, a guaranteed purchase price to suppliers of 
renewable energy, and/or a preferential loan or grants to renewable energy 
producers. Receipt of this subsidy is conditioned on the use of a certain 
percentage of local, rather than foreign, products or inputs.100 
Local-content requirements are popular with industrial policymakers 
because they impart significant direct and indirect benefits. First, they 
boost demand for domestically produced goods, even if the domestic good 
is inferior in quality to a foreign import. So long as the cost of the marginal 
difference is less than the size of the subsidy, a rational buyer will choose 
the domestic good, with resulting gains in employment. Depending on the 
size of the demand distortion, it even may allow the domestic industry to 
achieve certain benefits of scale. It can also increase local capacity gained 
by learning through doing that boosts the competitiveness of domestic 
firms. 
Second, the local-content subsidy may induce upstream foreign 
producers to establish production facilities inside the country in order for 
their products to count toward the local-content requirement. So long as the 
expected marginal cost of the foreign facilities and training the new work 
force is less than the expected marginal gain, such a shift in the foreign 
firm’s production location makes rational sense. Increased foreign 
 
96 Id. art. VI. 
97 Id. 
98 See infra notes 219–22 and accompanying text. 
99 SCM Agreement, supra note 91, art. 3.1(b). 
100 For a more detailed discussion of local-content requirements as applied to renewable energy 
sectors, see JAN-CHRISTOPH KUNTZE & TOM MOERENHOUT, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE 
DEV., LOCAL CONTENT REQUIREMENTS AND THE RENEWABLE ENERGY INDUSTRY—A GOOD MATCH? 
(2013). 
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investment creates even more local “green collar” jobs. It may also induce 
technology transfer through formal or informal channels.101 Finally, it may 
lead to the diffusion of certain nontechnological, sector-specific expertise 
(e.g., forecasting or supply chain management skills) that will boost the 
competitiveness of local firms. 
However, such subsidies are clearly trade distortive. They induce 
substitution away from otherwise more efficient imports toward less 
efficient domestic goods. As a result, they are one of two forms of 
subsidies banned outright under the SCM Agreement.102 Beyond subsidies, 
policies that generally require the use of a fixed volume or percentage of 
local content are also prohibited outright under WTO law.103 Thus, even if 
the program does not meet the legal requirement for a subsidy, it is still 
likely impermissible.104 
Despite local-content requirements being illegal per se, they have 
featured prominently in renewable energy policies worldwide. They have 
found favor with a wide range of governments in both developing—and 
perhaps more surprisingly—developed countries. Governments offering 
benefits for use of locally produced goods in their renewable energy 
programs include Brazil, China, Croatia, France, Greece, India, Italy, 
Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, and several U.S. states and Canadian provinces.105 
Below, we describe a few of these programs in greater detail. 
The earliest program to attract a trade challenge was a FIT scheme 
implemented by Ontario. Having campaigned on a platform of a “Greener 
Ontario,” the ruling Liberal Party implemented a FIT to spur renewable 
energy investment.106 However, the program came with a catch. To qualify 
for the FIT, after 2011, a solar energy producer must source at least 60% of 
its components from Ontario, while for large-scale wind energy producers, 
the threshold is 50%.107 
 
101 An example of a formal channel is if the foreign producer decides to enter the market through a 
joint venture arrangement, in which its technology is then shared with the joint venture partner. An 
example of an informal channel is through the diffusion of technological expertise by ex-employees of 
the foreign investor who acquire familiarity with the technology during the course of their employment. 
102 SCM Agreement, supra note 91, art. 3. 
103 See GATT, supra note 12, art. III.3. 
104 We note this because a contentious issue in the Canada-Renewable Energy case is whether the 
FIT amounts to a subsidy. 
105 For a comprehensive discussion of such policies, see KUNTZE & MOERENHOUT, supra note 100, 
at 13–30; Heymi Bahar et al., Domestic Incentive Measures for Renewable Energy with Possible Trade 
Implications (OECD Trade & Env’t Working Papers No. 2013/01, 2013). 
106 ONTARIO LIBERALS, MOVING FORWARD, TOGETHER: THE ONTARIO LIBERAL PLAN, 2007 
HIGHLIGHTS 1, 5 (2007). 
107 The minimum amount of Ontario-sourced content varies depending on a number of factors, 
including the renewable energy source (solar vs. wind), the scale of the project, and the year in which 
commercial operations begin. An exception is made for wind-power projects with a contract capacity 
under 10kW. See Ontario Power Authority, Feed-In-Tariff Program FIT Rules Version 1.5.1 (July 15, 
2011), at 16. Small-scale solar projects are subject to their own requirements. 
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The Liberals sought to spur job creation through pro-environmental 
policies designed to catapult Ontario to the forefront of clean technology 
manufacturing in North America.108 By that measure, the local-content 
requirements have been successful. In the first year alone, ten solar energy 
manufacturers and several wind energy and solar inverter companies 
“committed to set[] up solar module assembly plants in Ontario to meet” 
the requirement.109 The most visible of these is a multi-billion dollar deal 
with Korean manufacturer Samsung to build wind and solar energy plants 
in the province.110 
India has embraced a similar strategy. Despite its promising geography 
and climate for solar power, India has lagged dramatically behind other 
countries in developing a solar panel industry. Inspired by others, in 2010 
the government launched a FIT program that conditioned receipt of the 
subsidy on the use of Indian components.111 The government made no 
secret that this was part of its industrial policy, stating that the reason for 
the local-content requirements was to promote domestic manufacturing in 
the solar energy industry to help Indian manufacturers catch up to their 
foreign competitors.112 
 
108 ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE ENV’T, GO GREEN: ONTARIO’S ACTION PLAN ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 14 (2007). 
109 Tyler Hamilton, Energy Program a Good FIT for Ontario, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 27, 2010, 
at B1. 
110 Robert Benzie & Tyler Hamilton, Premier to Unveil Samsung Green Deal, TORONTO STAR, 
Jan. 20, 2010, at A4; Samsung Invests $7B in Ontario Wind & Solar, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM 
(Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2010/01/samsung-invests-can-
7b-in-ontario-wind-and-solar; Samsung, Ontario Sign $3 Billion Wind, Solar Deal, 
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/
article/2011/08/samsung-ontario-sign-3-billion-wind-solar-deal. 
111 The exact domestic-content requirements vary over time. In order to qualify to bid for a FIT rate 
in the first year of Phase 1 of the program (FY 2010–2011), the solar energy supplier must use 
photovoltaic modules manufactured in India. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU NAT’L SOLAR MISSION, MINISTRY 
OF NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY, BUILDING SOLAR INDIA: GUIDELINES FOR SELECTION OF NEW GRID 
CONNECTED SOLAR POWER PROJECTS BATCH-II, at 7 (2011), http://mnre.gov.in/file-manager/UserFiles/
jnnsm_gridconnected_24082011.pdf. By the second year of Phase 1 (FY 2011–2012), the requirement 
expands to include not only Indian-manufactured photovoltaic modules, but also photovoltaic cells. Id. 
at 7–8. Government officials have already announced that in later phases, as the technological prowess 
of Indian manufacturers expands, they plan to expand the domestic-content requirements to include 
other components such as inverters, the production of which is more technology intensive. See Natalie 
Obiko Pearson, India May Extend Local Equipment Usage Rule for Solar Power Beyond 2013, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2010, 5:06 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-13/india-may-
extend-local-equipment-usage-rule-for-solar-power-beyond-2013.html; Abhishek Shah, Solar Energy in 
India—Domestic Content Requirements May Be Made More Stringent for Longer Time, GREEN WORLD 
INVESTOR (Dec. 13, 2010), http://greenworldinvestor.com/2010/12/13/solar-energy-in-india-domestic-
content-requirements-may-be-made-more-stringent-for-longer-time. 
112 JAWAHARLAL NEHRU NAT’L SOLAR MISSION, MINISTRY OF NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY, 
TOWARDS BUILDING SOLAR INDIA 2, 7 (2010), http://www.mnre.gov.in/file-manager/UserFiles/mission
_document_JNNSM.pdf. 
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The local-content requirement has been a boon to Indian domestic 
manufacturers facing a cost disadvantage relative to foreign competitors 
(particularly those from China).113 Without the local-content requirement 
for the FIT, India’s solar energy producers would likely purchase imported 
photovoltaic modules and cells. Because the benefits from the FIT more 
than offset the higher cost of buying domestic, energy producers now have 
an incentive to buy domestic components, instead. 
Some governments simply provide bonuses for local-content use, 
rather than making it a threshold eligibility criterion for the FIT. Italy and 
Greece, for example, give higher FIT rates to producers that source a given 
percentage of their components from within the EU.114 Among developing 
countries, Turkey and Malaysia employ a similar scheme.115 
Nor are all local-content requirements tied to a FIT. China, for 
example, offered outright grants to individual wind turbine manufacturers 
ranging from $6.7 million to $22.5 million.116 The catch was that to qualify, 
a company needed to submit copies of receipts showing that they had 
purchased certain components made in China. Foreign companies could 
also qualify, but only if they shifted their component manufacturing to 
China. For China, the local-content requirement has been instrumental to 
its industrial policy’s success. Its benefits include greater employment, 
technology transfer, and increased global market share. The program’s 
impact is positive for the environment as well. Thanks to Chinese 
subsidies, wind turbines are now cheaper and therefore more widely 
 
113 Meredith Connolly, Mixed Reactions to India’s Solar Domestic Content Requirement, 
SWITCHBOARD (Jan. 9, 2012), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/mconnolly/mixed_reactions_to_indias
_sola.html (noting that some domestic firms view the local-content requirement as necessary in light of 
foreign competition). 
114 Nomos (2012:4062) Aξιοποίηση του πρώην Αεροδρομίου Ελληνικού−Πρόγραμμα 
ΗΛΙΟΣ−Προώθηση της χρήσης ενέργειας από ανανεώσιμες πηγές (Ενσωμάτωση Οδηγίας 
2009/28/ΕΚ)−Κριτήρια Αειφορίας Βιοκαυσίμων και Βιορευστών (Ενσωμάτωση Οδηγίας 2009/30/ΕΚ) 
[Development of the Athens former international airport HELLINIKON–PROJECT 
HELIOS−Promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (integration of Directive 
2009/28/EC)–Sustainability criteria of biofuel and bioliquids (integration of Directive 2009/30/EC)], 
EPHEMERIS TES KYVERNESEOS TES HELLENIKES DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.] 2012, A:70, art. 39, para. 
12 (Greece); Decreto Ministeriale 5 maggio 2011, n. 11A06083, art. 14(1)(d), in G.U. May 12, 2011, n. 
109 (It.); Decreto Ministeriale 5 luglio 2012, n. 12A07629, art. 4(5)(d), in G.U. July 10, 2012, n. 159 
(It.). The Italian program offers an additional premium for producers whose facilities use European-
made modules and inverters. Id. arts. 2(1)(v) & 5(2)(a). 
115 Paul Gipe, Turkey Adopts Limited Feed Law, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Jan. 17, 2011), 
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/01/turkey-adopts-limited-feed-law; Paul 
Gipe, Malaysia Adopts Sophisticated System of Feed-in Tariffs, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM 
(Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/04/malaysia-adopts-
sophisticated-system-of-feed-in-tariffs; see also infra notes 147 and 149. 
116 Sewell Chan, U.S. Says China Fund Breaks Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2010, at B1. 
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adopted.117 These gains, however, have come at the expense of foreign 
producers and foreign workers. Producers incur the cost of shifting 
production to China, while workers have lost their jobs outright. 
Practices in certain U.S. states offer an example of yet another form of 
a local-content subsidy—one targeting consumers rather than producers. 
Five U.S. states provide direct rebates to customers who switch over to 
certain renewable energy technologies.118 Like the Italian and Greek 
programs, the U.S. state programs provide an additional bonus for 
customers using equipment manufactured in state. These range from as low 
as 12.5%–20% (Massachusetts, California, Ohio)119 to as high as 120%–
240% (Washington)120. While the overt justification for these subsidies is 
environmental, the goals of job creation and keeping in-state manufacturing 
figure prominently in justifying these public expenditures. 
By lowering the cost of renewable energy production and/or 
consumption, each of the local-content programs provides positive 
environmental benefits. The problem is that each is conditioned on a trade-
distortive policy designed to favor local producers over foreign imports. 
Not surprisingly, they have led to a series of WTO challenges, which we 
discuss later in the Article. 
3. Export Restrictions.—The green industrial policies described 
above have been designed to boost the competitiveness of domestic 
renewable energy sectors. China, in particular, has implemented a third 
form of green industrial policy instrument with a different objective in 
mind. This involves placing restrictions on the export of scarce natural 
resources in the hopes of boosting the competitiveness of downstream 
domestic industries that rely on these resources as inputs. The export 
restrictions are enacted through a quota, a tax, or a combination of the two. 
 
117 Kari Williamson, Overcapacity and New Players Keep Wind Turbine Prices Down, 
RENEWABLE ENERGY FOCUS (May 3, 2012), http://www.renewableenergyfocus.com/view/25560/over
capacity-and-new-players-keep-wind-turbine-prices-down. 
118 For example, California provides rebates to customers installing one of nine types of 
technologies. See CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY CAL., SELF-GENERATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM 
HANDBOOK 1 (2011). New Jersey and Washington provide incentives for solar and wind energy 
installations, while the Massachusetts program is only for solar and Ohio’s is only for wind. See 
Renewable Energy System Cost Recovery, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-20-273 (2012); AMY 
GOMBERG, ENV’T OHIO, OHIO’S WIND ENERGY FUTURE (2007); MASS. CLEAN ENERGY CTR., 
COMMONWEALTH SOLAR II PHOTOVOLTAIC REBATE PROGRAM: PROGRAM MANUAL (2012),  
http://masscec.live.getfused.com/masscec/file/CSII_Solicitation_V10_Final.pdf; N.J.’S CLEAN ENERGY 
PROGRAM, RENEWABLE ENERGY INCENTIVE PROGRAM GUIDEBOOK 6–7 (2009), http://www.njcleanen
ergy.com/files/file/Renewable_Programs/CORE/REIPGuidebookfinal0202mq.pdf. 
119 See Strickland, Fisher Announce Wind Production and Manufacturing Incentives, GOVERNOR 
TED STRICKLAND (Feb. 8, 2007), http://www.tedstrickland.com/2-8-07-strickland-fisher-announce-
wind-production-and-manufacturing-incentives; MASS. CLEAN ENERGY CTR., supra note 118, at 8; 
CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY CAL., supra note 118, at 28–29. Note that the additional incentive in 
California is subject to a cap. See CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY CAL., supra note 118, at 27. 
120 See Renewable Energy System Cost Recovery, supra note 118, § 14(d). 
108:401 (2014) The Rise of Green Industrial Policy 
427 
Among the resources that China has restricted are a set of nine minerals 
and a group of “rare earth” elements.121 China has attempted to justify its 
restrictions, in some instances belatedly, as pro-environmental.122 The 
process of extracting and refining the elements causes ecological damage 
and poses grave environmental risks. For example, the extraction and 
processing of rare earths produces a radioactive waste product that can 
contaminate local water sources123 and increase cancer incidences.124 Export 
restrictions artificially constrain production, thereby diminishing 
environmental harm. As such, they are indeed environmentally 
beneficial.125 
The problem is that they introduce a trade-related market distortion. 
Only foreign consumers find themselves supply constrained and facing 
higher prices. Moreover, the same environmental objectives could be 
accomplished through a production, rather than an export, restriction, but 
without the negative trade impact. The latter point has raised doubts over 
whether environmental concerns truly motivate China’s export restriction 
policies.126 
Why is China resorting to export restrictions rather than production 
limits? To understand China’s viewpoint, consider the pattern of overall 
global mineral extraction. Today, China bears a disproportionate share of 
the world’s “dirty” mining. With only one-third of global reserves, China 
supplies 97% of the world’s rare earths.127 The United States, once the 
world’s leading producer, shut down all production in 1998, following 
 
121 The nine minerals at issue in the China-Raw Materials case on which China imposed export 
restraints were “bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon metal, yellow 
phosphorus and zinc.” See Panel Report, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials, ¶ 2.1, WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R (July 5, 2011) [hereinafter China-Raw 
Materials Panel Report]. The elements at issue in the China-Rare Earths case include “various forms of 
rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum.” See Request for Consultations by the United States, China—
Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, 1, WT/DS431/1 (Mar. 
15, 2012) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter China-Rare Earths Request for Consultations (U.S.)]. 
122 Peter Cai & Georgia Wilkins, China Cites Environment to Justify Grip on Rare Earths, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD, June 21, 2012, at 5. 
123 Lisa Margonelli, Down and Dirty: Hybrid Cars and Wind Turbines Need Rare-Earth Minerals 
that Come with Their Own Hefty Environmental Price Tag, ATLANTIC, May 2009, at 17, 17–18. 
124 See Lei Wu et al., [A Case-Control Study on the Risk Factors of Leukemia in Mining Areas of 
Rare-Earth in South Jiangxi] 24 ZHONGHUA LIU XING BING XUE ZA ZHI (中华流行病学杂志) 
[Chinese J. Epidemiology] 879, 879–82 (2003). 
125 This is assuming no production capacity constraint. In the face of such constraint, it is possible 
that increased domestic demand might substitute for reduced export opportunities, thereby eliminating 
the environmental gains. 
126 See, e.g., John W. Miller, Protectionism Hurts Effort to Pressure China, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 
2010, at A15. 
127 China Announces Second Rare Earth Export Quota for 2012, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Aug. 
23, 2012, 8:18 AM), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90778/7920534.html; Nick Valéry, The 
Difference Engine: More Precious than Gold, ECONOMIST BABBAGE BLOG (Sept. 17, 2010, 6:22 PM), 
http:///www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/09/rare-earth_metals. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
428 
environmental outcry over a radioactive spill into a California desert.128 The 
same story is true of other raw materials such as fluorspar.129 Other than 
Spain, no industrialized country mines fluorspar because of the associated 
environmental hazards, even though both the United States and France 
have an ample base of reserves.130 
As China has grown wealthier and its domestic manufacturing base 
has expanded, its policymakers ask: Why should China aggressively mine 
an exhaustible natural resource—and incur the resultant environmental 
harm—simply to supply the world market, when the rest of the world 
refuses to do so?131 Why not limit the use of exhaustible natural resources 
to its home market, as the United States has done with liquefied natural 
gas?132 
For Chinese policymakers, a key factor in analyzing the cost–benefit 
equation at hand is whether the minerals are used domestically or exported. 
Under both scenarios, the costs are the same: upstream extraction and 
processing generates negative environmental externalities. However, the 
offsetting benefits differ greatly, at least in Chinese eyes, depending on 
whether the mineral is subsequently exported for use by a foreign 
manufacturer or kept for domestic use. 
When kept in China, the downstream Chinese manufacturer later 
remits taxes back to the Chinese government on profits made from use of 
the mineral as an input. Although such taxes are not designated for 
environmental cleanup, they increase the central government’s fiscal 
capabilities to cover remediation costs. The same is not true of an overseas 
 
128 Mike Alberti, Digging a Deep Hole: Rare Earths Debacle Puts U.S. Trade Policy Under 
Scrutiny, REMAPPING DEBATE, Jan. 11, 2011; Katherine Bourzac, Can the U.S. Rare-Earth Industry 
Rebound?, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/421472/can-the-
us-rare-earth-industry-rebound (noting that in the 1970s and 1980s, the United States produced over 
seventy percent of the world’s supply). 
129 Fluorspar is used to manufacture a wide range of products including “aluminum, gasoline, 
insulating foams, refrigerants, steel, and uranium fuel.” Minerals Information: Fluorspar Statistics and 
Information, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/fluorspar. 
130 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 
2008, at 63 (2008). We use the year 2007 because this is the year prior to China’s policy shift on raw 
materials. See China-Raw Materials Panel Report, supra note 121, ¶ 2.4 (listing various measures that 
were implemented beginning in 2008 that were challenged in the subsequent WTO case). 
131 David Stanway & James Regan, Pollution the Big Barrier to Freer Trade in Rare Earths, 
REUTERS, Mar. 19, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/19/us-china-rareearth-id
USBRE82I08I20120319 (noting that “Chinese officials insist [that] the country’s dominance” in rare 
earths trade “is no longer anything to celebrate” as it has come with a heavy environmental price). 
132 Under the 1938 Natural Gas Act, companies must obtain an export license for liquefied natural 
gas. Some have suggested that the current policy which benefits U.S. domestic firms, if left unchanged, 
would make it difficult for the United States “to argue against China’s restrictions on exports of rare 
earth minerals.” See Richard McGregor & Ed Crooks, Obama Backs Rise in US Gas Exports, FIN. 
TIMES (U.S. ed.), May 6, 2013, at 1. 
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manufacturer who needs not remit any share of its profits to the Chinese 
government. 
More importantly, the extracted minerals serve as key inputs for 
several strategic industries, such as defense, high tech, and 
pharmaceuticals. When kept in China, the inputs presumably increase 
Chinese capabilities in these sectors and generate positive spillover effects 
for the rest of the economy (through supply chain linkages, innovation, 
jobs, etc.).133 For example, lanthanum extracted from Chinese mines is a 
key input for Chinese manufacturing of rechargeable car batteries.134 This, 
in turn, has sparked the development of an electric car industry in China 
and innovation in hybrid technologies. 
Put crudely, China’s view is that so long as the mineral is consumed 
within its borders, the positive externalities that emerge from domestic 
downstream use will more than compensate for the negative externalities 
that result from upstream extraction.135 Potentially environmentally harmful 
acts are acceptable if they trigger greater downstream benefits that will 
more than cover the remediation costs. However, once the mineral is 
exported, China fails to capture any positive downstream externalities but 
is left with the cost of upstream environmental harm.136 Export restrictions, 
unlike overall production limits, allow China to account for this 
difference.137 
China’s trading partners, however, suspect that the real drivers are 
geopolitics and industrial policy. During a territorial dispute with Japan in 
 
133 For an overview of the role played by select metals and minerals in aiding the development of 
key strategic industries, see Jane Korinek & Jeonghoi Kim, Export Restrictions on Strategic Raw 
Materials and Their Impact on Trade and Global Supply, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 255, 257–59 (2011). 
134 On the importance of lanthanum for hybrid car batteries, etc., see Maggie Koerth-Baker, 4 Rare 
Earth Elements that Will Only Get More Important, POPULAR MECHANICS, http://www.popular
mechanics.com/technology/engineering/news/important-rare-earth-elements (last visited Mar. 2, 2014); 
Stephen Kurczy, Top 5 ‘Rare Earth’ Minerals: What Are They?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 21, 
2010, 2:13 PM), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/1021/Top-5-rare-earth-minerals-
What-are-they/Lanthanum; see also Ucilia Wang, China Sets New Record for Renewable Energy 
Storage, FORBES (Jan. 4, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2012/01/04/china-
sets-new-record-for-renewable-energy-storage (describing China’s ambitions to build a battery industry 
for renewable energy). 
135 Interview with Advisor to Chinese Government (2011-G1). 
136 An environmental input–output analysis found that the largest driver of China’s increasing 
carbon emissions is its changing export composition, for which metal products accounted for the largest 
percentage increase in the proportion of export value. See Ming Xu et al., CO2 Emissions Embodied in 
China’s Exports from 2002 to 2008: A Structural Decomposition Analysis, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 7381 
(2011). 
137 China is not alone in applying export restrictions on natural resources. “More than one-third of 
all notified export restrictions are in resource sectors,” and export taxes are twice as likely in this sector 
as compared to other sectors. Michele Ruta & Anthony J. Venables, International Trade in Natural 
Resources: Practice and Policy 12–13 (WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2012-07, 2012). However, 
these restrictions pose special legal problems for China on account of its Protocol of Accession. See 
infra text accompanying note 143. 
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late 2010, for example, China cut off all exports of rare earth minerals to 
Japan, forcing Japan eventually to relent.138 In addition, the export 
restrictions have created a pricing dynamic where foreign downstream 
industries pay more for raw material inputs than their Chinese competitors. 
Some contend that China is using the shortage of rare earth exports and raw 
materials as a tool to entice foreign high-tech firms to relocate their 
manufacturing operations to China.139 This, in turn, would give China 
greater access to downstream technologies.140 Finally, the higher prices for 
rare earth exports and raw materials provide Chinese downstream 
producers with a cost advantage for inputs over their foreign competitors. 
WTO law places limits on the use of certain forms of export 
restrictions. GATT Article XI prohibits the use of export quotas and export 
bans, except under certain limited conditions.141 Because this is a GATT 
provision, unlike the subsidy provisions, it is subject to the balancing test 
of GATT Article XX exceptions. Export taxes, on the other hand, are 
another matter. In general, WTO members are allowed to apply “duties, 
taxes or other charges” on exports.142 However, Article 11.3 of China’s 
Protocol of Accession states that “China shall eliminate all taxes and 
charges applied to exports” unless certain exceptions apply.143 These 
provisions have provided grounds for China’s trading partners to challenge 
its export restrictions at the WTO. 
 
 * * * 
 
When one surveys the range of green industrial policy instruments that 
have been deployed—from taxes and subsidies to quotas and bans—four 
points become clear. First, the common perception that China and India are 
refusing to address global environmental problems144 is incorrect. Their 
 
138 See Keith Bradsher, In Dispute, China Blocks Rare Earth Exports to Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
23, 2010, at B1. Days after the embargo was imposed, Japan released the captain of the Chinese fishing 
vessel seized in the disputed territorial waters. See Chico Harlan & William Wan, Chinese Boat Captain 
Is Released, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2010, at A7. The territorial issues over the disputed 
Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands remain unresolved. 
139 Keith Bradsher, China Tightens Grip on Rare Minerals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at B1. 
140 Sudeep Reddy & Jared A. Favole, Obama to Push China on Minerals, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 
2012, at A1 (citing a research note by Professor Scott Kennedy for an economics consulting firm that 
highlighted this as an objective of the Chinese government’s rare earth policy). 
141 GATT, supra note 12, art. XI(1). 
142 Id. 
143 These exceptions are if the export taxes or other charges are “specifically provided for in . . . 
this Protocol or applied in conformity with the provisions of Article VIII of the GATT 1994.” See 
Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, art. 11.3, WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001). 
144 See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn, Climate Policy: Separating Fact from Fantasy, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 557, 571–72 (2009) (“[M]any, such as China and India, do not perceive it in their interest to sign 
an agreement today that would require them to take costly actions. . . . They are not willing to sacrifice 
growth today for the benefit of future generations . . . .”); Christine McIsaac, Opening a GATE to 
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governments are forging ahead with a wide range of pro-environmental 
policies, deploying hundreds of millions of dollars in support. Despite 
having an economy half the size of the United States, China now leads the 
world in renewable energy investments, spending 53% more than the 
second-ranked United States.145 
Second, they are not doing so out of altruistic concern or a sense of 
global responsibility. Instead, they are intentionally enacting industrial 
policies designed to benefit their economic competitiveness. Positive 
environmental gains are simply a corollary benefit. Although their 
governments will not articulate it this bluntly, their pragmatic message is 
essentially: We are willing to do our part to address the world’s 
environmental problems. But our per capita carbon emissions are still 
vastly lower than those who point fingers at us for not doing our share. As 
developing countries, we have not been the primary contributors of 
environmental harm to date, nor have we enjoyed much of the economic 
gains derived from these impacts. To address a problem we neither caused 
nor benefited from, we expect to be compensated meaningfully through 
financial and/or technology transfer. And if industrialized countries are 
unwilling to do so, then we will take action only when it serves our own 
domestic economic interests, particularly when it strategically advantages 
our nascent manufacturing sectors. 
Third, other developing countries are taking notice and following suit. 
Although we focused primarily on examples in China and India, they are 
far from alone: Brazil adopted a local-content requirement as part of its 
preferential development loan program.146 In 2010, Turkey revised its 
renewable energy law to include a local-content premium in its FIT 
scheme.147 Ukraine did the same in 2011.148 Similarly, Malaysia’s new 
 
Reduce Global Emissions: Getting over and into the WTO, 44 J. WORLD TRADE 1053, 1072–73 (2010) 
(describing the “New Major Players” such as China, India, and Brazil as “free riders”); Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 905, 908 (2008). 
145 China first overtook the United States in renewable energy investment in 2009, but relinquished 
its lead in 2011 on account of the United States’ one-time stimulus spending that year. In 2012, China 
invested $67.7 billion, compared with $44.2 billion by the United States. See Pilita Clark, China Heads 
Renewable Energy Spending, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2013, at 17. For information about the size of each 
economy, see World Economic Outlook Database: October 2012 Edition, INT’L MONETARY FUND 
(Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/index.aspx. 
146 To qualify for a loan from Brazil’s development bank, BNDES, wind turbine manufacturers are 
required to source initially “40% of their components from Brazilian suppliers,” with the requirement 
eventually increasing to 60%. ERNST & YOUNG, RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNTRY ATTRACTIVENESS 
INDICES 29 (2012). 
147 Law on Utilization of Renewable Energy Sources for the Purpose of Generating Electrical 
Energy, Law No. 5346, art. 6/B & sched. II (Dec. 29, 2010) (Turk.). 
148 Vitaliy Radchenko, Ukraine—Change to Local Content Requirement for Renewable Energy 
Sector, JD SUPRA L. NEWS (June 22, 2011), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ukraine-change-to-local
-content-requir-77720. 
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Renewable Energy Act, passed in 2011, includes a sophisticated schedule 
with bonuses for use of local components.149 
Finally, green industrial policies have also emerged in developed 
economies from Europe to North America. The policy justifications may 
vary, from ensuring energy security and economic competitiveness to 
delivering on political promises to create high-paying “green collar” jobs 
and, of course, environmental protection. The bottom line is that green 
industrial policy has gone global. 
C. Green Industrial Policy and Trade Disputes 
Not surprisingly, the proliferation of green industrial policy has led to 
a renewed outbreak of trade litigation related to environmental matters. As 
explained above, many, perhaps most, of the pro-environmental policies 
discussed above are illegal under WTO rules. In this section, we highlight 
the two primary forms of trade actions countries have used to challenge 
their trading partners’ green industrial policies. Not only are formal 
conflicts over Next Generation cases on the rise, but the litigation fora in 
which such cases are being fought are also expanding. 
1. Multilateral Action: WTO Dispute Settlement.—The most obvious 
forum for a country to address green industrial policies that violate WTO 
rules is the WTO itself.150 The WTO offers several benefits—it is a 
multilateral forum, it oversees both negotiation and judicial interpretation 
of international trade rules, and it offers binding dispute resolution.151 
Several options exist within the WTO. The softest approach is for a 
country to express its concern during regular meetings of a WTO 
committee. For example, a country may raise qualms over another 
country’s subsidies for renewable energy industries in the Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The United States has used this 
forum to call on China and India to provide additional notification for over 
200 of its subsidies programs, many of which are provided through local 
governments and some of which have environmental implications.152 The 
EU, Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, and Turkey joined 
the United States’ request.153 
 
149 Renewable Energy Act 2011, Act 725, Schedule (Section 2) (Malay.). 
150 This is subject to the caveat that all parties to the dispute are WTO members. 
151 See WORLD TRADE ORG., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION . . . IN BRIEF (2009), 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf. 
152 See Request from the United States to India Pursuant to Article 25.10 of the Agreement, 
Subsidies, G/SCM/Q2/IND/20 (Oct. 10, 2011); Request from the United States to China Pursuant to 
Article 25.10 of the Agreement, Subsidies, G/SCM/Q2/CHN/42 (Oct. 11, 2011). 
153 See WTO Comm. on Subsidies & Countervailing Measures, Minutes of the Regular Meeting 
Held on 26–27 October 2011, ¶¶ 111–17, 120–24, G/SCM/M/79 (Feb. 2, 2012); WTO Comm. on 
Subsidies & Countervailing Measures, Minutes of the Regular Meeting Held on 26 April 2012, ¶¶ 52–
56, 59–64, G/SCM/M/81 (July 25, 2012). 
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Another mechanism is to raise concerns during a country’s Trade 
Policy Review. Each WTO member’s trade policies are reviewed on a 
regular basis, and trading partners may use this review to inquire into 
questionable trade policies. For example, in September 2011, the United 
States took advantage of this mechanism to express concern that the local-
content requirements of India’s FIT “explicitly shut out imports,” 
criticizing it as comparable to the “trade-restrictive policies pursued in 
previous, poorly-performing periods of India’s economic development.”154 
U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk later described India’s unwillingness 
to come clean as “intolerable.”155 
Finally, a country can choose to file a formal legal complaint through 
the WTO’s dispute settlement process. This can lead to hearings before a 
dispute panel and the possibility of an appeal before the WTO’s Appellate 
Body (AB). Should the panel (or ultimately the AB) find that the defendant 
party’s policies are in fact illegal under WTO law, then that country is 
given “a reasonable period of time” to bring its policies into compliance 
with WTO obligations.156 If a country does so, then no additional legal 
remedies are available. In particular, the dispute settlement regime at the 
WTO tends not to offer compensatory or punitive relief for past violations. 
But if a country continues to breach after the reasonable period has expired, 
the complainant may then impose a fixed amount of tariffs against the 
defendant’s exports.157 
The past three years have witnessed a rapid growth of WTO cases 
concerning green industrial policy. The first such dispute, China-Raw 
Materials, was filed by the United States and EU against China in June 
2009,158 with Mexico later joining as an additional complainant.159 The 
panel ruled against China’s export restrictions,160 and the majority of the 
 
154 Ambassador Michael Punke, U.S. Permanent Representative to the WTO, Statement at the 
WTO Trade Policy Review of India (Sept. 14, 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/speeches/transcripts/2011/september/statement-ambassador-michael-punke-wto-tra. 
155 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Exec. Office of the President, United 
States Details China and India Subsidy Programs in Submission to WTO (Oct. 06, 2011), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/october/united-states-details-china-and-
india-subsidy-prog. 
156 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 21, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. 
157 For additional details of this institutional design, including an analysis of the implications and 
shortcomings, see Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, and Trade Law 
Enforcement, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 102 (2011). 
158 Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of 
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/1 (June 25, 2009); Request for Consultations by the European 
Communities, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS395/1 
(June 25, 2009). 
159 Request for Consultations by Mexico, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various 
Raw Materials, WT/DS398/1 (Aug. 26, 2009). 
160 China-Raw Materials Panel Report, supra note 121, ¶¶ 8.16–8.22. 
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panel’s rulings were upheld by the AB.161 The AB also upheld the panel’s 
finding that China had bargained away its right to exercise the GATT 
Article XX exceptions to justify export taxes as part of its WTO 
accession.162 
The United States filed a second complaint in December 2010, 
challenging the legality of China’s local-content requirements for subsidies 
for wind power equipment.163 Interestingly, it was the United Steelworkers, 
a labor union, rather than American wind turbine producers, who pressured 
the White House to bring the China-Wind Power Equipment case.164 They 
worried that the program would cost their workers jobs as American 
producers shifted their manufacturing to China to take advantage of the 
subsidy. Rather than litigate, China agreed to a settlement in which it 
dropped the offending program. The White House declared it a major 
victory for ensuring “fairness for American clean technology innovators 
and workers.”165 
Third, in 2010 and 2011, Japan and the EU challenged the legality of 
Ontario’s local-content requirement for its FIT program.166 Japan expressed 
concern “about possible proliferation of such protectionist measures all 
over the world” and urged the WTO to take action.167 In December 2012, 
the WTO panel ruled against Canada, holding that the FIT violated national 
treatment obligations under the GATT and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures.168 The Appellate Body, in May 2013, 
 
161 China-Raw Materials AB Report, supra note 13, ¶ 362. 
162 Id. ¶¶ 279, 284–85, 362. 
163 Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Concerning Wind Power 
Equipment, WT/DS419/1 (Jan. 6, 2011) [hereinafter China-Wind Power Equipment Request for 
Consultations (U.S.)]. 
164 UNITED STEELWORKERS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: UNITED STEELWORKERS’ SECTION 301 
PETITION DEMONSTRATES CHINA’S GREEN TECHNOLOGY PRACTICES VIOLATE WTO RULES (2010), 
http://assets. usw.org/releases/misc/section-301.pdf. 
165 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Exec. Office of the President, China 
Ends Wind Power Equipment Subsidies Challenged by the United States in WTO Dispute (June 7, 
2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/june/china-ends-wind
-power-equipment-subsidies-challenged (noting also that the deal “supports well-paying jobs here at 
home”). 
166 Request for Consultations by Japan, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector, WT/DS412/1 (Sept. 16, 2010); Request for Consultations by the European 
Union, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS426/1 (Aug. 16, 2011). 
167 Press Release, Ministry of Econ., Trade & Indus., Gov’t of Japan, Request for the Establishment 
of a Panel on Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector in Ontario, Canada 
(June 1, 2011), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2011/0601_01.html. 
168 Canada-Renewable Energy Panel Report, supra note 7, ¶ 7.167. However, a majority of the 
panel found that the FIT did not amount to a subsidy as it did not confer a benefit, while one member 
sharply dissented. Id. ¶¶ 7.320–7.328, 9.1–9.23. 
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reversed parts of the panel decision, but overall, allowed the panel’s ruling 
that the measures violated national treatment obligations to stand.169 
Fourth, following the China-Raw Materials ruling, the United States, 
EU, and Japan each filed complaints in 2012 challenging China’s export 
restrictions on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum.170 In March 2014, 
the Panel issued a ruling against China, declaring that its export restrictions 
violated its WTO commitments.171 At the time of this writing, appeals of 
the Panel decision are pending before the Appellate Body. 
Fifth, in November 2012, China filed a complaint challenging local-
content restrictions in Europe FITs.172 The case remains at the consultation 
stage at the time of this writing. 
Sixth, in February 2013, after months of trying to negotiate a 
resolution, the United States formally initiated a complaint over India’s FIT 
program.173 India has been shoring up its defense for some time in 
anticipation of a case,174 and at the time of this writing, the United States, 
after unsuccessful consultations, has requested the establishment of a Panel. 
In contrast, during the same period of 2009–2013, the WTO handled 
only one Classic type of trade and environment case (U.S.-Tuna II175). Next 
Generation conflicts have clearly superseded Classic conflicts within the 
WTO. WTO litigation is no longer about environmentally contingent 
market access policies but, rather, green industrial policies. Given how 
many such policies run afoul of WTO rules, we should expect countries to 
turn even more to the WTO to force their trading partners to dismantle 
these pro-environmental, but quasi-protectionist, policies. 
 
169 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, ¶¶ 6.1–6.2, 
WT/DS412/AB/R, WT/DS426/AB/R (May 6, 2013). 
170 China-Rare Earths Request for Consultations (U.S.), supra note 121; Request for Consultations 
by the European Union, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and 
Molybdenum, WT/DS432/1 (Mar. 15, 2012); Request for Consultations by Japan, China—Measures 
Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, WT/DS433/1 (Mar. 15, 2012). 
171 Panel Report, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and 
Molybdenum, WT/DS431/R, WT/DS432/R, WT/DS433/R (Mar. 26, 2014). 
172 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
173 Request for Consultations by the United States, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar 
Cells and Solar Modules, WT/DS456/1 (Feb. 11, 2013). 
174 Amiti Sen, India Confronts US, EU at WTO over National Solar Power Generation 
Programme, ECON. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2011, 4:19 AM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/
2011-10-26/news/30324230_1_solar-mission-solar-power-solar-projects; Amiti Sen, India to Defend 
Local-Buy Policy in Solar Mission as US, EU Protest, ECON. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012, 3:21 AM), 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-02-03/news/31021273_1_solar-mission-trade-
related-investment-measures-solar-energy. 
175 Panel Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of 
Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011); Appellate Body Report, United States—
Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 
WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012). 
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2. Unilateral Action: Trade Remedies Cases.—Multilateral action, 
however, carries real costs. It is time-consuming and resource intensive. In 
addition, the WTO dispute settlement process does not readily offer the 
prospect of retrospective damages.176 Some countries, frustrated with 
trading partners’ industrial policies and unwilling to wait for the WTO to 
proceed through its long dispute settlement process with no clear prospect 
of damages, are resorting to unilateral action instead. 
WTO law permits a country to take unilateral action under certain 
circumstances. First, a domestic industry must file a case with the 
government petitioning for increased tariffs against its trading partner. A 
government may also proactively begin investigating a case ex officio. This 
case is then adjudicated through a domestic administrative proceeding. 
Provided certain conditions are met, a country may then impose unilateral 
tariffs against goods from its trading partner found to be in violation. 
Collectively, such actions are known as trade remedies.177 
Two forms—the countervailing duty (CVD) and the antidumping 
duty—are particularly important in this context.178 A CVD case may be 
filed against producers benefiting from a subsidy, while an antidumping 
case may be filed against any producer “dumping” a good onto a market. 
That is, both CVD and antidumping complaints are lodged against foreign 
companies directly, rather than against the foreign governments. 
Dumping is defined as pricing below the “normal value” of a 
product;179 thus, antidumping cases, at least in theory, target foreign firms 
that “dump” their products below market rates, ostensibly to take over the 
domestic market. CVD cases aim to stem the effects of impermissible 
subsidization. In both instances, the effect of the subsidy or dumping must 
be to cause or threaten “material injury to an established industry” or to 
“materially retard[] the establishment of a domestic industry.”180 If this can 
be proven, a unilateral tariff may be imposed to offset the negative impact 
of the subsidy or “dumping.”181 This tariff may be kept in place 
indefinitely, but must be reviewed every five years.182 
 
176 The vast majority of cases impose prospective remedies that commence from the expiry of the 
“reasonable period of time.” A few cases from the GATT era deviate from this practice. For a more 
complete discussion, see PETROS C. MAVROIDIS ET AL., THE LAW OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION (WTO) 1084 (2010). 
177 Besides increased tariffs, a trade remedy may also take the form of a quantitative restriction if 
imposed as a safeguard. See GATT, supra note 12, art. XIX. 
178 A third form is a safeguard, but because the standards for obtaining relief under WTO safeguard 
provisions are more difficult to satisfy, it is not frequently used as a trade remedy. See Chad P. Bown, 
Why Are Safeguards Under the WTO So Unpopular?, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 47 (2002). 
179 GATT, supra note 12, art. VI:1. 
180 Id. art. VI:1 & VI:6(a). 
181 Id. art. VI:2 & VI:3. 
182 SCM Agreement, supra note 91, art. 21.3. 
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The use of unilateral tariffs to challenge green industrial policy is a 
recent development but seems likely to become increasingly common. On 
October 19, 2011, SolarWorld Industries America Inc., the American 
subsidiary of a German solar panel manufacturer, filed a petition seeking 
antidumping and countervailing duties against Chinese manufacturers of 
solar panels. SolarWorld’s petition was supported by six other American 
solar panel manufacturers who chose to remain anonymous (out of fear of 
potential Chinese retaliation), adopting the collective moniker of the 
Coalition for American Solar Manufacturing.183 The petition alleged that 
eight types of Chinese subsidy programs for renewable energy caused or 
threatened to cause material injury to U.S. manufacturers of solar cells.184 
The petition accused the Chinese firms benefiting from these subsidies of 
“dumping” their products into the United States at low prices. It asked the 
U.S. government to impose punitive tariffs in the form of CVDs and 
antidumping duties against the Chinese manufacturers.185 
The U.S. International Trade Commission ruled preliminarily in the 
petitioners’ favor186 and the Department of Commerce announced in March 
2012 that it would enact preliminary CVD tariffs of 2.90% to 4.73% 
against Chinese solar panel manufacturers.187 China greeted this news in a 
restrained manner because of the low nominal figures of the tariffs.188 
 
183 Keith Bradsher, Trade War in Solar Takes Shape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at B1. For more 
information about the Coalition of American Solar Manufacturers, see COALITION FOR AM. SOLAR 
MANUFACTURING, http://www.americansolarmanufacturing.org (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
184 Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into Modules, from the 
People’s Republic of China: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 76 Fed. Reg. 70,966, 
70,966, 70,968–69 (Nov. 16, 2011). The eight types of subsidy programs noted in the petition were: 
(a) “Grant Programs,” (b) “Government Provision of Goods and Services for Less Than Adequate 
Remuneration (LTAR),” (c) “Government Provision of Land for LTAR,” (d) “Policy Lending to the 
Renewable Energy Industry,” (e) “Income and Other Direct Tax Exemption and Reduction Programs,” 
(f) “Indirect Tax and Tariff Exemption Programs,” (g) “Export Credit Subsidy Programs,” and 
(h) “Export Guarantees and Insurance for Green Technology.” Under the category of grant programs, 
six specific programs are listed in the petition, of which three are provided by subcentral government 
entities. Under the category of income and other direct tax exemption and reduction programs, eleven 
specific programs are listed in the petition, of which two are administered by subcentral government 
entities and two are specific for certain localities. Id. at 70,968–69. 
185 The petition also accused the Chinese manufacturers of “dumping” their products into the U.S. 
market and asked the U.S. government to impose antidumping duties against Chinese solar cells as 
well. See id. at 70,966. 
186 See News Release, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, USITC Votes to Continue Case on Crystalline 
Silicon Photovoltaic Cells and Modules from China (Dec. 2, 2011), available at http://www.usitc.gov/
press_room/news_release/2011/er1202jj1.htm. 
187 Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into Modules, from the 
People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 77 Fed. Reg. 
17,439, 17,456 (Mar. 26, 2012). 
188 Keith Bradsher & Matthew L. Wald, A Measured Rebuttal to China, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 
2012, at B1; see also Press Release, Suntech Power Holdings Co., Ltd., Suntech Response to 
Preliminary Decision on CVD Tariffs in the Subsidy Investigation on PV Cells from China (Mar. 20, 
2012), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/suntech-response-to-preliminary-
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
438 
However, two months later, the Department of Commerce announced that 
it would impose an additional tariff, in the form of an antidumping duty of 
about 31% to 250% against Chinese solar panel manufacturers.189 These 
duties are among the largest ever levied against a product through a 
unilateral tariff and will likely increase the cost of solar panels 
significantly.190 
China denounced the American action against its renewable energy 
subsidies as a worrying indication of U.S. trade protectionism.191 
Furthermore, China has sent clear signals that the United States’ actions are 
leading both countries down a dangerous path toward a tit-for-tat green 
trade war.192 
Weeks after the U.S. industry petition was filed in October 2011, two 
Chinese industry associations responded by filing their own petition asking 
their government to impose trade remedies against U.S. renewable energy 
producers.193 They noted that American producers benefited from an array 
of subsidies, including the expansion of the renewable energy production 
tax credit194 and investment tax credit schemes195 under the 2008–2009 
 
decision-on-cvd-tariffs-in-the-subsidy-investigation-on-pv-cells-from-china-143531726.html 
(discussing Chinese solar cell importer Suntech’s reaction to the preliminary decision). 
189 Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into Modules, from the 
People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value, Postponement 
of Final Determination and Affirmative Preliminary Determination of Critical Circumstances, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 31,309, 31,321–23 (May 25, 2012). 
190 Keith Bradsher & Diane Cardwell, Chinese Solar Panels Face Big Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 
2012, at B1; Editorial, Obama’s Tariffs on China’s Solar Products Will Cost U.S., BLOOMBERG (May 
15, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-15/obama-s-tariffs-on-china-s-solar-
products-will-cost-u-s-.html. 
191 Press Release, Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, Head of MOFCOM Bureau 
of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports Comments on U.S. Preliminary Ruling of Anti-Dumping and 
Anti-Subsidy Investigation Against Imports of Solar Panels from China (Dec. 6, 2011), available at 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/policyreleasing/201112/20111207864408.shtml.  
192 Chinese Officials Warn of Protectionism in Solar Panel Sector, XINHUA (Nov. 12, 2011, 
11:45 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-11/12/c_122271120.htm. 
193 See China Chamber of Commerce for Imp. & Exp. of Mach. & Electronic Products & China 
New Energy Chamber of Commerce, Petition for the Investigation of Trade Barriers Imposed by the 
United States, Oct. 2011 (on file with authors) [hereinafter Chinese Industries’ CVD petition]. 
194 See id. at 36–37. The program offers a per-kilowatt-hour tax credit for electricity generated by a 
wide range of eligible renewable energy sources. It was originally enacted as part of the Energy Policy 
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1212, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2006 & Supp. IV 
2010)), and has been extended on numerous occasions, including in the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 1101, 1102, 123 Stat. 115, 319 (codified at 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 45, 48), in February 2009. For more information, see U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Renewable Electricity 
Production Tax Credit (PTC), DATABASE OF ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, 
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=US13F&re=1&ee=0 (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2014). 
195 See Chinese Industries’ CVD petition, supra note 193, at 29–30, 38–40. The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 allowed “taxpayers eligible for the federal renewable 
electricity production tax credit (PTC)” to receive either a grant from the U.S. Treasury Department or 
108:401 (2014) The Rise of Green Industrial Policy 
439 
stimulus acts, the Department of Energy’s loan guarantee program for 
technology innovations for energy efficiency and renewable energies,196 
and accelerated depreciation schemes for renewable energy investments.197 
In addition, the petition also challenged the subsidy programs of nine U.S. 
states.198 Chinese producers alleged that the various U.S. subsidy programs 
harmed their ability to export to the United States and other foreign 
markets.199 
A week after the U.S. Department of Commerce levied its preliminary 
antidumping ruling against Chinese solar panels, China’s Ministry of 
Commerce responded with its own preliminary ruling against the subsidy 
programs of five U.S. states.200 In July 2012, China launched its own 
antidumping investigation into American and South Korean exports to 
China of polysilicon, the main ingredient used in solar cells.201 This 
investigation has resulted in preliminary tariffs as high as 57% for 
American polysilicon and 48.7% for South Korean polysilicon.202 American 
 
“the federal business energy investment tax credit (ITC)” in lieu of the PTC. It also allowed any 
taxpayers eligible for the ITC to instead receive the grant from the U.S. Treasury Department for new 
installations begun before December 31, 2013. See 26 U.S.C. § 48 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); U.S. Dep’t 
of Energy, Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC), DATABASE OF ST. INCENTIVES FOR 
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=
US02F (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
196 See Chinese Industries’ CVD petition, supra note 193, at 32. Pursuant to Title XVII of the 
federal Energy Policy Act of 2005, the Department of Energy was authorized to issue more than $10 
billion in loan guarantees for projects that “avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases; and . . . employ new or significantly improved technologies.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 16513 (2006). A wide range of sectors qualify for these loan guarantees, including solar 
thermal/photovoltaics, wind, hydroelectric, tidal/wave energy, ocean thermal, and biodiesel. See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 16511–16516; 10 C.F.R. pt. 609; U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy—Loan 
Guarantee Program, DATABASE OF ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsire
usa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=US48F&re=1&ee=0 (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
197 The two programs mentioned in the petition are the Federal Modified Accelerated Cost-
Recovery System (MACRS) and the MACRS Bonus Depreciation (2008–2013). See Chinese 
Industries’ CVD petition, supra note 193, at 34–35. For more information about these programs, see 
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Modified Accelerated Cost-Recovery System (MACRS) + Bonus Depreciation 
(2008–2013), DATABASE OF ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.
org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=US06F&re=1&ee=1 (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
198 The policies under challenge included grants, tax credits, tax rebates, tax exemptions, bonds, 
loans, and loan guarantees. See Chinese Industries’ CVD petition, supra note 193, at 29–43. 
199 See id. at 44–51. 
200 Press Release, Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, Announcement No. 26 of 
2012 of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China on the Preliminary Investigation 
Conclusion on the U.S. Policy Support and Subsidies for Its Renewable Energy Sector (May 27, 2012), 
available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/buwei/201206/20120608161120.shtml; 
Areddy & Ma, supra note 4. 
201 Leslie Hook, China Launches Anti-Dumping Probe Against US, FIN. TIMES (July 20, 2012, 
12:07 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3623df3a-d254-11e1-abe7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2dwN6
FgbO. 
202 Wayne Ma, China Aims Duties at the U.S., South Korea, WALL ST. J. (Asia ed.), July 19–21, 
2013, at 17. 
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officials responded by saying that they would look closely into whether the 
Chinese tariffs violate WTO rules.203 
The Chinese actions are a clear signal that two can play this game. 
Having fired the opening salvo against China, the United States can expect 
its producers to be hit with similar retaliatory action in the Chinese market. 
European producers were also placed on notice that they too may be hit 
with retaliatory tariffs as their products have been subject to a Chinese 
antidumping investigation since November 2012.204 If the EU did not back 
down off its preliminary tariffs, China warned that it may follow with 
sanctions against European polysilicon as well.205 
This phenomenon of resorting to unilateral trade remedies cases rather 
than multilateral WTO litigation is now spreading beyond the already 
contentious Sino–American relationship. Already, South Korean solar 
manufacturers have found themselves in the crosshairs of the Sino–
American trade row.206 Unilateral trade remedies cases have also spread to 
Europe207 and India.208 The Indian dispute, in turn, has managed to ensnare 
Malaysia and Taiwan into the growing solar panel trade wars.209 
Following the success of its U.S. case, in July 2012, German 
manufacturer SolarWorld spearheaded a coalition of European solar panel 
companies to file an antidumping complaint with the European 
Commission against Chinese solar panels.210 In September 2012, despite 
strong diplomatic pressure from China to reject the petition, the EU 
announced that it would launch an investigation.211 The antidumping case is 
the largest ever, covering $20 billion worth of imports.212 Weeks later, 
European companies filed another complaint with the European 
Commission seeking countervailing duties against Chinese imports as 
 
203 Michael Martina, ENERGY UPDATE 3—China Hits U.S., S.Korea with Solar Material Duties, 
Skirts EU Decision, REUTERS, July 18, 2013, available at http://mobile.reuters.com/article/rbssEnergy
News/idUSL4N0FO1VF20130718. 
204 Becky Beetz, China Launches EU Polysilicon Anti-dumping Investigation, PV MAG. (Nov. 1, 
2012), www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/china-launches-eu-polysilicon-anti-dumping-invest
igation_100009062. 
205 Leslie Hook, China Imposes Tariffs on Polysilicon Exports from US and S Korea, FIN. TIMES 
(July 18, 2013, 1:14 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a82b8294-ef9b-11e2-8229-00144feabdc
0.html#axzz2hAsRVjZ1. 
206 Note that South Korea has tried to downplay the trade tensions, with a senior official noting that 
the Chinese tariffs were “‘expected’ and would not have a big impact” on bilateral trade relations. Id. 
207 See infra notes 210–16 and accompanying text. 
208 See infra notes 219–21 and accompanying text. 
209 See infra notes 219–21 and accompanying text. 
210 Anneli Palmen & Christoph Steitz, UPDATE 2—SolarWorld Files Anti-Dumping Complaint in 
EU-Source, REUTERS, July 25, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/25/solar
world-eu-complaint-idUSL6E8IPBD920120725. 
211 Bradsher, supra note 5. 
212 Id. 
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redress for allegedly illegal Chinese government subsidies.213 China 
responded with a warning that “the EU’s decision to check China’s solar 
products via protectionist measures is short-sighted and the bloc would 
become its own victim.”214 
The investigation sparked considerable tension within the EU. In May 
2013, the Commission recommended imposing provisional antidumping 
duties, averaging 47% against Chinese solar panels.215 However, eighteen 
EU members, including Germany, opposed the Commission’s 
recommendation, leading the EU Trade Commissioner to agree to impose a 
lower rate averaging 11.8% for two months, while attempting to negotiate a 
settlement.216 In July 2013, the EU and China agreed that the Chinese 
producers would limit their exports to a certain quota and sell above a 
negotiated minimum price.217 So long as Chinese exporters complied with 
the terms of the settlement agreement, the EU would refrain from imposing 
tariffs. Those that refused, however, would be subject to the 47% 
provisional duties.218 
The United States and European trade rows with China also inspired 
India’s solar panel manufacturers to seek action against its competitors. In 
June 2012, the Indian Solar Manufacturer’s Association filed a petition 
accusing American, Chinese, Malaysian, and Taiwanese producers of 
dumping their products at “ridiculously low” prices into the Indian 
market.219 An industry spokesperson described the foreign products’ prices 
 
213 Joshua Chaffin, EU Solar-Panel Makers File China Lawsuit, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2012, 
8:24 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5e8939fc-072e-11e2-b148-00144feabdc0.html. 
214 This comment was delivered via an editorial from Xinhua, China’s official news agency. See 
Editorial, It Is Unwise for EU to Launch Solar Trade War Against China, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 7, 2012, 
11:04 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2012-09/07/content_15742516.htm. 
215 Joshua Chaffin, Solar Flares, FIN. TIMES, May 10, 2013, at 1; Jonathan Stearns, EU Said to 
Plan Duties up to 67.9% on China Solar Panels, BLOOMBERG (May 9, 2013, 12:20 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-08/eu-said-to-plan-tariffs-of-up-to-67-9-on-chinese-solar-
panels.html. 
216 Peter Spiegel et al., Brussels Offers Beijing Reprieve in Solar Panel Dispute, FIN. TIMES, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1038136e-cd02-11e2-90e8-00144feab7de.html (last updated June 4, 
2013). 
217 The settlement agreement set a quota of seven gigawatts per year of solar products, with a 
minimum price of €0.56 per watt. It is “expected to last until the end of 2015.” Joshua Chaffin, EU and 
China Settle Trade Fight over Solar Panels, FIN. TIMES (July 27, 2013, 12:35 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4e468c26-f6ab-11e2-8620-00144feabdc0.html. 
218 Id. “Out of 140 Chinese solar panel exporters,” about 90 have agreed to the terms of the 
settlement. The approximately 50 exporters that have refused to accept the minimum price will be 
subject to the 47% duties on any further shipments of solar panels to the EU. See Keith Bradsher, Weak 
Finish from Europe on Chinese Solar Panels, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2013, at B1; Chaffin, supra note 
217. 
219 Shreya Jai, Solar Equipment Makers Seek Anti-dumping Duty on Imports from China, Malaysia, 
Taiwan, ECON. TIMES (June 2, 2012, 3:02 AM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-06-
02/news/31984187_1_anti-dumping-duty-dgad-local-manufacturers. 
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as “artificial and not at all related to the cost of the product.”220 In late 
November, the Indian government announced that it had accepted the 
petition and begun an investigation into the allegations.221 In the near 
future, a growing number of countries’ solar panel producers could find 
themselves facing significantly higher tariffs in four major markets—the 
United States, Europe, China, and India. 
Nor are trade remedies cases restricted simply to solar panels. In 
December 2012, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced that it 
would levy additional tariffs of up to 71% on Chinese wind turbines and up 
to 58% on Vietnamese wind turbines, in response to an antidumping case 
brought by four American companies.222 A Chinese industry spokesperson 
denounced the quasi-protectionist move, describing the United States as 
“trying to protect their own industry amid an economic downturn, without 
considering the development of the whole industry chain.”223 The additional 
tariffs are expected to cut into the profits of wind developers in the United 
States and diminish demand for wind power.224 
III. KEY IMPLICATIONS FROM THE RISE OF GREEN INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY DISPUTES 
Trade tensions between major countries are undoubtedly increasing on 
account of green industrial policies. Five years ago, one might have 
predicted that the next wave of trade and environment cases would be over 
carbon taxes and “cap-and-trade” schemes; yet this has not proven to be the 
case. A dispute over environmentally conditioned market access, such as 
the European aviation ETS conflict, is now the exception rather than the 
rule. Since 2009, the vast majority of disputes are Next Generation 
conflicts, where industrial policies feature both environmental benefits and 
significant protectionism. This shift has largely gone unnoticed, but it 
presents major implications for conceptualizing the legal and political 
economy dynamics of trade and environment conflicts in four key respects. 
 
220 Id. 
221 Natalie Obiko Pearson, India Starts Anti-dumping Investigation of Solar-Cell Imports, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 29, 2012, 12:28 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-29/india-starts-
anti-dumping-investigation-of-solar-cell-imports.html. 
222 Brian Wingfield, U.S. Boosts Import Duties on Chinese Wind-Energy Firms, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 
19, 2012, 3:05 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-19/u-s-boosts-import-duties-on-chinese
-wind-energy-firms.html. 
223 Sarah Chen, China Slams U.S. Tariff Move, WALL ST. J. (Asia ed.), July 31, 2012, at 3 (quoting 
a response to the earlier preliminary ruling). 
224 Diane Cardwell, U.S. Raises Tariffs on Chinese Wind-Turbine Makers, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 
2012, at B4. 
108:401 (2014) The Rise of Green Industrial Policy 
443 
A. The Rise of Multiple Fora: The WTO and Domestic 
Administrative Courts 
First, Next Generation disputes are being litigated not only at the 
WTO but also in trade remedies proceedings before domestic 
administrative agencies. While such proceedings are subject to oversight by 
WTO rules, they have the advantage of allowing governments to take quick 
unilateral action without waiting for costly and time-consuming 
multilateral review.225 
Nevertheless, the development of a second channel for trade dispute 
litigation presents its own risks. Without a neutral multilateral body serving 
as an impartial adjudicator, the outcome of these administrative 
proceedings may be seen as politically motivated. Aggrieved parties will 
put pressure on their own government to respond in kind. This gives rise to 
an increased risk of a unilateral action sparking a tit-for-tat trade dispute. 
The Sino–American and Sino–European trade rows over solar panels 
provide a disturbing lens into how such disputes can evolve into a brewing 
trade war.226 
Furthermore, the options for postjudgment compliance differ 
dramatically when a ruling stems from a WTO proceeding as opposed to a 
domestic trade remedy proceeding. We will elaborate further on this 
difference and the resulting implications in Part IV when we assess 
potential options for legal reform. For now, it is sufficient to note that the 
rise of green industrial policies has opened the door to trade and 
environment disputes being subject to domestic administrative proceedings 
in addition to WTO proceedings. This presents new risks for escalating 
trade tensions. 
B. “Good” Versus “Bad” Actors: It’s Become Much More Complicated 
Second, the rise of Next Generation disputes has upended the Classic 
stereotype of the developed country as the environmentally friendly actor 
and the developing country as environmentally unfriendly. In many 
instances, the roles are now reversed. Often, it is the developing country 
that adopts the pro-environmental policy, and it is the developed country 
that seeks to have the policy declared illegal under WTO law. Even in 
instances where the country adopting the pro-environmental subsidy policy 
is a developed country (e.g., Canada’s feed-in-tariff program), it is its 
fellow developed countries that seek to have it terminated.227 
To the extent that the defendant countries are viewed as “bad” actors, 
it is not because of their unwillingness to tackle environmental problems, 
but because of their demand for rents for their domestic industry in 
 
225 See supra Part II.C.2. 
226 See supra Part II.C.2. 
227 See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text. 
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exchange for pro-environmental actions. Such demands may reduce 
welfare overall and violate the spirit of international trade rules. Yet, even 
here, the case against them is not altogether clear. Some sympathize with 
the developing countries’ argument that they are being asked to bear a 
disproportionate cost for environmental harms caused primarily by 
developed countries.228 Developing countries have a pressing need to lift 
their populations out of poverty, and developed countries have steadfastly 
refused to make the standard-of-living sacrifices necessary to move toward 
developing countries’ much lower per capita emissions rates. To some, this 
quid pro quo demand may appear reasonable, especially when trade law 
carves out exceptions to allow for other welfare-reducing rents that reflect 
historical realities.229 
Even with the export restrictions, China points out that it could simply 
follow the developed countries’ lead of limiting production and exporting 
the environmentally harmful processing steps to other countries.230 The fact 
that it chooses to bear this cost internally, some Chinese argue, should 
entitle it to tax others that “free ride” off the environmental harms that it 
internalizes.231 In levying such a tax, is China behaving as a mercantilist 
actor exploiting its natural resources for strategic gain? Or is China simply 
taking a more holistic view of supply chain externalities and forcing 
consumers to incur the cost of upstream environmental harms if they refuse 
to provide compensating positive externalities downstream? Would overall 
global welfare truly be better off, China asks, if it simply shut down 
production over environmental concerns, as the United States and others 
have done, thereby triggering a massive spike in input prices, instead of 
trying to remedy perceived differences in externalities through tax and 
quota policies? At the very least, these questions show that the situation is 
far less black-and-white than the earlier Classic cases. 
 
228 See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Northern Economic Obligation, Southern Moral Entitlement, and 
International Environmental Governance, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 363, 366 (2002); Amy Sinden, 
Allocating the Costs of the Climate Crisis: Efficiency Versus Justice, 85 WASH. L. REV. 293, 295–96 
(2010); Cheng Zheng-Kang, Equity, Special Considerations, and the Third World, 1 COLO. J. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 57, 62 (1990). 
229 For example, preferences given by former imperial powers to their former colonies were 
grandfathered and are permissible, in contravention of the most-favored-nation treatment requirement. 
See GATT, supra note 12, art. I:2–3. 
230 China Defends Rare Earth Export Policy Adjustment, XINHUA (June 28, 2012, 6:45 PM), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/28/c_131682241.htm (quoting a Foreign Ministry 
spokesman asking other countries to boost their production); Lilian Luca, Transition to the Future: 
Mining and Mineral Processing in China, CHINA ANALYST (May 2010), http://www.thebeijingaxis.com
/tca/editions/the-china-analyst-may-2010/47 (suggesting that China will increasingly tap into mining 
and processing companies in developing countries as domestic environmental concerns grow and 
Chinese firms seek to expand global market share). 
231 Interview with Advisor to Chinese Government (2011-G2). 
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C. The Changing Political Economy: A Shattering of Key Alliances 
Not only has the role of states changed in these conflicts, but so too 
has the domestic political economy of these states. The earlier Classic 
disputes featured an unusual alliance in the U.S. of labor unions, domestic 
producers, and environmental activists in developed countries.232 This was 
hardly a natural partnership, but their interests aligned in favor of the policy 
of limiting environmentally unfriendly imports. Environmental and animal 
rights groups took the lead, using market access to put pressure on 
otherwise reluctant foreign producers; labor unions saw it as a means to 
protect domestic jobs; and domestic producers saw it as a way to level the 
playing field from stringent domestic environmental regulations.233 
Building on the strength of these alliances, the environmental lobby 
was extremely active in asserting its interests. Following the Tuna/Dolphin 
ruling against the U.S. import ban, environmental groups raised the alarm 
at the eagerness of unelected, ad hoc adjudicators in Geneva to neuter 
domestic environmental regulations.234 Environmental groups quickly 
added trade law experts and lobbyists to their staff to lobby government 
delegations and bureaucrats at the GATT/WTO headquarters in Geneva.235 
They also mobilized public opinion through provocative articles and street 
protests.236 Their campaigns made trade and environment a major issue, 
forcing the WTO to be more conscious of striking a proper balance 
between trade and environmental interests. 
With the rise of Next Generation disputes, this alliance on trade 
matters has been challenged. Labor unions have turned avowedly anti-
environment as far as the green industrial policies of developing countries 
are concerned. In September 2010, it was the United Steelworkers, not 
domestic producers, who first petitioned the White House to take action 
against Chinese stimulus spending for China’s renewable energy sectors. 
“These subsidies,” the union argued, “are helping Chinese producers ramp 
up production, seize market share, drive down prices, and put global 
competitors out of business.”237 Although the White House demurred on the 
overall request, the petition did result in the U.S. filing of the China-Wind 
 
232 Note that our argument is not that this alliance held firm across all environmental matters, but 
rather only as it pertained to trade disputes. These groups might have opposed one another domestically 
when Congress was deciding whether to adopt the environmental measure. Only after it was adopted 
are we contending that an alliance developed where they collectively pushed to expand its application to 
include trading partners. 
233 See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
234 See, e.g., Robert F. Housman & Durwood J. Zaelke, The Collision of the Environment and 
Trade: The GATT Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10268 (1992); David Hunter’s 
observation at text accompanying infra note 246. 
235 Interview with David Hunter, supra note 43. 
236 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
237 UNITED STEELWORKERS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 164, at 4. 
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Power Equipment case.238 Labor unions have also actively supported the 
ongoing trade remedies cases against Chinese solar panel manufacturers.239 
They view the imposition of unilateral tariffs as a means to stem the 
outsourcing of manufacturing jobs in the renewable energy sector to China 
and other countries. 
Domestic industry producers have split their allegiances. In the recent 
U.S. trade remedies case against China, industry divided into two rival 
coalitions. The Coalition for American Solar Manufacturing (CASM), 
composed of six solar panel manufacturers (who chose to remain 
anonymous out of fear of potential Chinese retaliation), supported 
unilateral tariffs.240 A rival group of 150 solar companies formed the 
Coalition for Affordable Solar Energy (CASE) to lobby against tariffs.241 
CASE argued that trade remedies would backfire, costing the United States 
up to 60,000 jobs as solar adoption rates and installation jobs decreased.242 
The industry divide represents, on the one hand, the split between upstream 
producers and downstream users, and on the other hand, the split between 
domestic producers that have already outsourced some production to China 
versus those that are still attempting to keep manufacturing in the United 
States. Domestic industry no longer speaks with a united voice.243 The most 
interesting actors, however, have been the environmental groups. Their 
actions in recent Next Generation disputes pose a stark contrast to their 
loud activism in the earlier Classic disputes, suggesting a Sherlock Holmes 
phrase—the dog that didn’t bark. The WTO ruling in China-Raw 
Materials, declaring that China is not allowed to use export taxes for any 
environmental purposes whatsoever, is of serious concern for those who 
believe that China must be encouraged to raise its level of environmental 
protection.244 So too are the unilateral trade remedies cases in the United 
States. These rulings raise the price of solar panels and delay their 
adoption. Yet, after actively crusading for a more pro-environmental 
 
238 China-Wind Power Equipment Request for Consultations (U.S.), supra note 163. 
239 Erik Siemers, Steelworkers Union Joins SolarWorld’s China Fight, SUSTAINABLE BUS. OR., 
http://www.sustainablebusinessoregon.com/articles/2011/11/steelworkers-union-joins-solarworlds.html 
(last modified Nov. 8, 2011). 
240 Bradsher, supra note 183. For more information about the Coalition of American Solar 
Manufacturers, see COALITION FOR AM. SOLAR MANUFACTURING, supra note 183. 
241 Coalition for Affordable Solar Energy, Case Fact Sheet: Protecting the Future of American 
Solar Power (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). 
242 Id. 
243 The Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA), which includes both manufacturers as well as 
project developers, in an attempt to straddle this divide and speak for the industry as a whole, has taken 
a policy stance calling for “[a]lternatives to [i]nternational [t]rade [l]itigation” (as a nod to those 
opposed to trade remedies) while also emphasizing the need “to build consensus on government best 
practices, including acceptable forms of industry support” (as a nod to domestic manufacturers harmed 
by foreign practices). See SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, 2013 POLICY PRIORITIES—FEDERAL & STATE 
2 (2013), http://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/resources/2013-Policy-Priorities2013-03-11_0.pdf. 
244 For a further discussion of the WTO ruling, see supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text. 
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agenda at the WTO throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, global 
environmental groups have retreated into near silence. Not one 
environmental group criticized these rulings. 
Environmental groups’ lobbying of the WTO Secretariat has also 
quieted in recent years, despite the uptick in disputes. In the three WTO 
cases challenging Chinese green industrial policies, no environmental 
group weighed in with a formal amicus brief or even an informal press 
commentary about the environmental issues at stake. Nor is the silence 
limited to disputes with China. Even in Canada’s feed-in-tariff program, a 
case between developed countries, only three Canadian environmental 
groups filed a joint amicus brief in favor of Canada’s program.245 All of the 
major environmental groups have remained quiet. 
Why didn’t the dog bark? Why has the environmental community, 
particularly U.S. environmental and antiglobalization groups that took such 
a leading role in denouncing the WTO’s Tuna/Dolphin and Shrimp/Turtle 
decisions, been so quiet in the face of decisions with similarly practical 
significance, if not more so? 
Based on our interviews with several environmental NGO attorneys, a 
number of factors appear to be at work. First, there is a capacity constraint 
problem. Some environmental groups have scaled back on the staff and 
resources focusing on trade and environment issues. Even for those with 
staff, the Next Generation cases implicate new areas of substantive trade 
law with which their staff lawyers may be unfamiliar. As David Hunter, 
former Executive Director of the Center for International Environmental 
Law (CIEL), explains: 
Back in the 1990s, when this became a major issue, CIEL had four attorneys 
on this. They have closed their Geneva office. They now have nobody 
working full time on [trade and environment]. The globalization dispute has 
settled out and people moved to other issues. The environmental community 
no longer has as much capacity to engage in the details of trade and 
environment disputes. Plus, trade law has moved forward and it is a technical 
area. You can’t now just wade in and engage with people.246 
Much of environmental groups’ silence is due to a strategic choice 
about competing priorities. For many environmental groups, passage of 
effective national and international climate change reduction measures sits 
atop their wish list. For either of these to happen, there must be U.S. 
congressional legislation. The failure of the Copenhagen negotiations was 
due in part to Congress’s failure to pass the Waxman–Markey climate 
bill—the United States could not offer any binding commitments in 
 
245 Amicus Curiae Submission of International Institute for Sustainable Development et al., 
Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WT/DS412/R (2012). 
246 Interview with David Hunter, supra note 43. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
448 
international negotiations.247 It is hard to get other countries to adopt a 
treaty with targets and timetables if the world’s largest economy has 
nothing on the table. 
For a domestic bill to pass, labor’s support remains critical. In return, 
this requires keeping quiet about Next Generation disputes that place 
environmental and labor interests at loggerheads. It is telling that the White 
House did not receive a single comment from environmental groups in 
response to organized labor’s petition against China’s wind power subsidy 
programs. From our interviews, there is no doubt that many in the 
environmental community understood the climate change benefits from 
China’s initiatives, but they did not want to risk alienating organized labor. 
As David Hunter observed, “Given the constituency the environmental 
groups are trying to get along with, there is no net positive in putting 
resources into that issue.”248 Environmental Defense Fund’s trade expert, 
Jennifer Haverkamp, agrees. “Environmentalists spent lots of effort to 
create the BlueGreen alliance and develop momentum for climate 
legislation. They are going to tread carefully when labor has put a lot of 
effort into a trade challenge.”249 The same is true for the solar power 
conflicts. Many environmental groups well understand the anti-
environmental costs associated with CVDs and antidumping duties. 
Nevertheless, they do not want to be seen as pro-China and against the 
American “green collar” worker, lest they lose organized labor’s support 
for any future climate change legislation. 
Despite the clear environmental cost stemming from the WTO and 
domestic trade remedies rulings, most environmental groups are choosing 
to hold their fire, hopeful that the larger prize of climate legislation remains 
within their grasp. This silence, however, is not without cost. Because 
environmental groups have sidelined themselves, the decisions that 
industrialized governments are making in the Next Generation disputes are 
increasingly reflective of the interests of labor unions and domestic 
producers that have not outsourced production overseas. To the extent that 
there is opposition, it is coming from domestic producers with more 
globalized supply chains and from downstream producers.250 Importantly, 
and unlike the Classic trade and environment disputes, pressure is not 
coming from the environmental interest groups, though they most certainly 
 
247 Stephen L. Kass, Examining the New Realities from the Copenhagen Accord, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 
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have a dog in this fight since the Next Generation cases will influence the 
shape of green industrial policies going forward. 
As a result of this silence, the environmental implications of the Next 
Generation disputes no longer factor heavily into the political calculus of 
how to proceed on WTO cases or domestic trade remedies litigation. 
Domestic policymakers, when deciding trade remedies or WTO actions, 
instead weigh primarily the interests of labor and different domestic 
producers, without substantial regard for the environmental impact. The 
lack of serious environmentalist pressure is a significant loss in the 
international trade debate. 
While less obvious, the silence of environmental groups is also 
jeopardizing efforts to build alliances and constituencies in China, India, 
and other developing countries. In many of these countries (China in 
particular) the lack of a robust domestic NGO community means that 
domestic interest groups rely on foreign activists to champion their cause. 
Chinese and Indians argue, and not without cause, that they are being sent 
distinctly mixed messages.251 Anyone who follows the climate change 
debate well understands that as go India and China with greenhouse gases, 
so goes the world. China is already the world’s largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases,252 and India is on pace to rival the United States by 
2030.253 As a result, even if policy changes result in massive greenhouse 
gas reductions in the United States and EU over the next decade, these 
would be for naught if India and China do not follow course. It is no 
surprise that the environmental community has so vigorously called for 
actions that will strengthen India and China’s reliance on renewable 
sources of energy.254 
One can well understand China and India’s frustration, then, when 
policies that do exactly this are subject to international condemnation, 
challenges at the WTO, and unilateral trade remedies. And when this 
happens, the very environmental groups that have been calling on China 
and India to increase their use of renewables refuse to condemn such 
actions. Chinese and Indians are becoming skeptical about whether these 
environmental groups are truly the global interest groups that they claim to 
be, as willing to stick up for the environmental interests of developing 
 
251 Interview with Advisor to Chinese Government (2011-G2), supra note 231; Interview with 
Indian Government Official (2012-G2); Interview with Advisor to Indian Government (2012-G4). 
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254 See, e.g., China Environmental News Alert, SWITCHBOARD (Oct. 30, 2013), http://switchboard.
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countries as those of industrialized ones. Instead, they increasingly view 
these environmental groups as beholden to the special interests of the West, 
and are therefore more skeptical of engaging with global environmental 
groups to find common solutions.255 
The export restriction cases on raw materials and rare earths present 
environmental groups with a different challenge. On its face, the WTO 
rulings in China-Raw Materials and China-Rare Earths appear to be just 
the kind of action environmental and antiglobalization groups have 
denounced in the past—international trade law striking down domestic 
measures that protect the environment.256 Yet, no environmental group has 
chosen to weigh in. Here, the problem facing environmental groups is not 
the question of jeopardizing a political coalition for climate change 
legislation but, rather, whether this is a battle worth fighting. China’s 
environmental justifications for the export restrictions are plausible but not 
compelling. They could well be bogus justifications for protectionist 
policies. Environmental groups do not want to risk appearing as apologists 
for Chinese policies that are very unpopular in the United States, EU, and 
Japan and that indeed may threaten national security. Therefore, rather than 
condemning the WTO rulings, they have simply remained quiet. 
The basic point is that the rise of green industrial policy disputes has 
dramatically changed the dynamics of the domestic politics on trade and 
the environment. No longer is there a stable alliance of disparate interest 
groups pushing governments in developed countries to take a more pro-
environmental stance against the incursion of trade law, as there was in the 
Classic cases. Instead, the interest groups themselves are split. The labor 
unions remain vocal, but have switched to railing against pro-
environmental policies in other countries, now that developing countries 
are implementing them through industrial policy. Domestic producers 
themselves are split, reflecting the different strategies that they have taken 
with respect to managing global supply chains. And environmental groups, 
whom one might expect to be resisting these anti-environmental 
developments, are instead staying silent. As they stake their strategy on 
maintaining key domestic alliances for potential future climate change 
legislation, they risk losing the trust of natural allies in developing 
countries. 
 
255 One interviewee explained, “Western advocacy groups are very useful when we want to direct 
international attention toward an environmental problem. But we do not trust them when it comes to 
giving advice about what should be our government’s policies.” Interview with Indian Government 
official (2012-G2), supra note 251. Accord Interview with Advisor to Chinese Government (2011-G2), 
supra note 231. Of course, this may not be true of an individual environmental matter. For example, 
ordinary Chinese are more likely to trust foreign recordings of air quality than those of their own 
government. See Clearing the Air?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 2012, at 41. However, our point pertains to 
larger systemic policy prescriptions. 
256 See supra notes 160–62; see also supra note 171 (discussing the Panel ruling in China-Rare 
Earths which was not yet released as of this writing). 
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D. The Loss of Balance 
So far, we have suggested that the rise of Next Generation green 
industrial policy disputes has altered both the international and domestic 
political economy of trade and environment cases. A similarly dramatic 
shift is also occurring in the WTO law being applied in these disputes with 
respect to how adjudicators balance the competing trade and environmental 
interests. 
Recall from Part I that almost all of the earlier Classic disputes 
involved alleged violations of GATT provisions. With varying success, 
countries sought to justify their trade measures under the GATT Article XX 
exceptions, which involve a two-step “balancing” mechanism between 
trade and environmental interests. The mechanism requires adjudicators to 
first consider whether the policy measure fulfills the substantive obligation 
of being “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”257 or 
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources . . . made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption.”258 Provided this is met, adjudicators must next examine 
whether the policy measure nevertheless “would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” or “a disguised restriction on 
international trade.”259 GATT Article XX effectively requires adjudicators 
to weigh whether the positive environmental impact of a regulation 
outweighs its potential negative trade impact. If so, the door is open for an 
exception to a country’s GATT obligations. 
While activists initially worried that this balancing tilted in favor of 
trade interests, the Shrimp/Turtle ruling helped assuage these concerns by 
confirming that pro-environmental policy measures with extraterritorial 
effects could be implemented so long as this was done in a fair and 
nondiscriminatory manner.260 With the Classic cases, there was a perception 
of a relatively fair balancing test at work. As Jennifer Haverkamp, former 
Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Environment and Natural 
Resources and now International Climate Director at the Environmental 
Defense Fund, observes, “environmentalists felt they had won the 
transparency battles and the Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body decision made 
clear that trade was not the evil black box it had looked like in 1990.”261 
 
257 GATT, supra note 12, art. XX(b). 
258 Id. art. XX(g). 
259 Id. art. XX. 
260 See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Toward a Greener GATT: Environmental Trade Measures and the 
Shrimp-Turtle Case, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 31, 32 (2000) (“The ruling suggests that countries can defend 
unilateral import bans as permissible environmental measures under the GATT as long as they avoid 
unfair discrimination.”); see also Howse, supra note 41, at 516–21 (addressing critics of the Appellate 
Body’s Shrimp/Turtle jurisprudence). 
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In most Next Generation disputes, by contrast, this balancing of trade 
and environmental interests disappears. Instead, the applicable law 
effectively acts as a strict liability standard, requiring adjudicators to find 
that so long as there is a violation of a trade obligation, the environmental 
policy is illegal. This is true regardless of the size of the environmental 
impact or whether it is sufficiently large enough to offset the negative trade 
impact. The disappearance of a balancing test means that in many of the 
Next Generation disputes, trade interests will trump. 
Why has this happened? The environmental defenses under GATT 
Article XX are available to the defendant if the complaint involves 
allegations of a breach of a GATT obligation.262 Unlike the Classic cases, 
most of the Next Generation disputes are not about breaches of GATT 
obligations. A large number of the Next Generation disputes concern the 
legality of pro-environmental subsidies issued as part of an industrial 
policy. This is true of Canadian, European, and Indian feed-in tariffs, 
China’s wind and solar subsidies, and the renewable energy rebate 
programs of U.S. states. The applicable treaty law governing such subsidies 
is the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM 
Agreement), not the GATT.263 
Unlike the GATT or the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT),264 the SCM Agreement does not contain an implicit balancing test 
within its treaty provisions. Instead, the SCM Agreement originally 
addressed environmental issues through the provision of a “safe harbor” 
exception in Article 8 of the SCM Agreement. Certain subsidies were 
deemed “non-actionable,” meaning that no country could take action, either 
unilaterally through trade remedies or multilaterally through WTO 
litigation, against such subsidies.265 However, this environmental safe 
harbor expired in 2000 and has not been renewed.266 The same is true of the 
nonactionable category for research and development, under which 
subsidies for basic research of renewable energy would have fallen.267 
 
262 The AB has also held that the GATT Article XX exceptions are available in the context of an 
accession protocol where explicit textual mention is made of the WTO agreements inclusive of the 
GATT. See Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution 
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶¶ 217–33, 
WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009). 
263 For a reminder of the applicable provisions, see supra Part II.B. 
264 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120. 
265 SCM Agreement, supra note 91, art. 8.2. This exception was limited to “assistance to promote 
adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or regulations 
which result in greater constraints and financial burden on firms,” and subject to additional 
requirements concerning its costs, recurrence, scope, and general availability. Id. art. 8.2(c) (footnote 
omitted). 
266 Id. art. 31. 
267 Id. art. 8.2(a). This exception was subject to further limitations regarding its cost and scope. 
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Today, the SCM Agreement has no environmental exceptions. So long as 
there is a violation of any SCM Agreement provision, the subsidy program 
must be abandoned, no matter how great the environmental benefit. 
Some scholars have suggested that the GATT Article XX exception 
could be interpreted as applying to the SCM Agreement in limited 
contexts.268 Rob Howse, for example, advocates having the WTO “simply 
clarify through an interpretative understanding that the existing Article XX 
applies to the SCM Agreement, given its status as a lex specialis of the 
GATT.”269 GATT Article XX need not be incorporated into the SCM 
Agreement directly; instead, the WTO could simply interpret the SCM 
Agreement as permitting nondiscriminatory subsidies for legitimate public 
purposes.270 To date, the WTO Appellate Body has appeared reluctant to 
take such an approach. When it has turned to the jurisprudence of one 
treaty to examine the meaning of another, it has done so in instances where 
the legal terminology employed in both treaties is nearly identical (i.e., 
there is a clear “textual hook”).271 To date, no GATT exception has been 
declared applicable to a non-GATT treaty on account of the latter being lex 
specialis. Making such a move more difficult is the fact that the SCM 
Agreement was not silent about exceptions, but addressed them through the 
Article 8 provisions on nonactionable subsidies, which negotiators 
explicitly chose not to renew.272 Under current jurisprudence, the SCM 
Agreement does not provide leeway for a balancing test for environmental 
interests. So long as there is a violation of a trade interest, because the pro-
environmental subsidy falls into a prohibited category or demonstrates 
“adverse” effects, it is illegal and must be abandoned. 
The lack of a balancing mechanism also holds true in the domestic 
trade remedies cases that feature prominently in the Next Generation 
disputes. Countervailing duty cases fall under the SCM Agreement 
 
268 For an overview of both sides to this debate, see Rubini, supra note 14, at 559–70. 
269 ROBERT HOWSE, CLIMATE MITIGATION SUBSIDIES AND THE WTO LEGAL FRAMEWORK 18 
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271 See, e.g., Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services 
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12, 2009) (applying GATS Article XIV(a) jurisprudence on “public morals” to a GATT Article XX(a) 
defense using identical language); Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and 
Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R ¶¶ 7.362–7.369 (Sept. 2, 2011) (applying GATT Article XX(b) 
jurisprudence to the interpretation of the “more trade restrictive than necessary” standard to a TBT 
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272 See Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, Resurrecting the Dead? The Expired Non-Actionable Subsidies and the 
Lingering Question of ‘Green Space,’ 8 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L., no. 2, 2011, at 2, 8–9 
(explaining that the WTO members allowed the green-light subsidies to expire after “[i]t became 
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Subsidies & Countervailing Measures, Minutes of the Regular Meeting Held on 1–2 November 1999, 
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described above. Antidumping cases are governed by their own specialized 
treaty, the WTO Agreement on Antidumping (ADA), which again does not 
have an environmental exception.273 So long as the complaint can prevail 
on the three prongs of dumping, injury, and causation, the government 
authorities will unilaterally impose an antidumping duty.274 No offset is 
permitted in the tariff rate for environmental reasons; hence, the recent U.S. 
antidumping ruling against Chinese solar panels raised tariffs by as much 
as 250%.275 
To be clear, balancing does not disappear in every Next Generation 
case. In instances where export quotas are challenged, GATT Article XI is 
implicated and therefore the GATT Article XX defenses are available.276 
However, China-Raw Materials clarified that even in some Next 
Generation cases involving GATT provisions, the balancing mechanism 
still may not be available because the GATT Article XX defense was 
bargained away, either explicitly or implicitly, as part of accession 
negotiations when China joined the WTO. The Appellate Body confirmed 
this was the case in China’s Protocol of Accession with respect to export 
taxes.277 Thus, while the Article XX balancing of interests is available for 
other countries, it disappears for China’s use of export taxes. This issue-
specific, country-specific approach to not applying the GATT Article XX 
balancing test has huge implications, given China’s central role in global 
environmental affairs. 
Taken together, the scope for balancing trade versus environmental 
interests has shrunk dramatically in Next Generation disputes. GATT 
Article XX balancing remains relevant in a few instances (e.g., export 
restrictions), but, even then, it is subject to caveats depending on the 
defendant and the conditions of its WTO accession protocol. For the vast 
majority of cases (i.e., those concerning subsidies or trade remedies), no 
balancing of interests is authorized under the applicable law. So long as the 
trade interests are violated, the policy is illegal. Trade interests simply win, 
regardless of the size of the environmental benefit produced by the 
measure. 
IV. ARE LEGAL REFORMS NECESSARY? 
If one cares about environmental protection, the rise of Next 
Generation disputes paints a disturbing picture. While Part II provided the 
optimistic news that countries, including China and India, are undertaking 
 
273 See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
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275 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
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policies to address global environmental problems, Part III showed that 
these efforts may well be stymied by three developments. First, developed 
countries, which have traditionally been pro-environmental in their trade 
policy, are actively opposed to many of China and India’s pro-
environmental policy measures because of their industrial policy linkages. 
China has responded by challenging the trade legality of American and 
European renewable energy policies. Second, environmental groups, which 
have traditionally championed environmental interests in these disputes, 
have turned conspicuously silent and are unwilling to press for greater 
accommodation of green industrial policy measures. The debate, in turn, is 
dominated by labor unions and domestic producers, which have pivoted 
from defending domestic pro-environmental trade regulations toward 
opposing foreign green industrial policies. Third, the applicable law itself is 
shifting away from accommodating environmental concerns, given that 
neither the SCM Agreement governing subsidies nor the agreements 
governing unilateral trade remedies require any balancing of environmental 
versus trade interests. 
As a result, and not surprisingly, the rulings in the Next Generation 
disputes have been unfavorable to environmental interests. In China-Raw 
Materials, the WTO ruled that China must eliminate the use of export 
quotas and taxes on natural resources whose extraction and processing are 
environmentally harmful.278 The ongoing China-Rare Earths case follows a 
similar fact pattern, with a similar ruling from the WTO Panel (with the 
appeal still pending as of this writing). Domestic trade remedies cases have 
resulted in the U.S. Department of Commerce levying tariffs of 31%–250% 
on Chinese solar panels, raising costs significantly for solar installation.279 
The EU has followed the United States’ lead, and China may well respond 
with trade remedies of its own against U.S. renewable energy products. 
Meanwhile, Canada’s feed-in-tariff program has already been deemed 
illegal by the WTO, and European and Indian programs are currently under 
attack at the WTO.280 
While individual cases have been in the news, the larger patterns 
underlying this overall shift and their implications have largely escaped the 
attention of commentators. Only a handful of academics and analysts have 
commented on this phenomenon, with most arguing for comprehensive 
reform of WTO treaties.281 We begin Part IV with a short overview of the 
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main reform proposals that have been advocated. We then posit what is 
likely to happen if, as is likely, the status quo continues. We argue that the 
situation may not be as bleak as feared. Instead, the expected 
environmental consequences will vary dramatically depending on the fora 
in which trade litigation is pursued. While most attention has been focused 
on the WTO, we suggest that domestic trade remedies cases pose a much 
greater threat to environmental interests. This area has received scant 
attention but, in fact, warrants the greatest need for reform. We therefore 
conclude by offering suggestions for a series of narrowly tailored reforms 
of trade remedies to better accommodate the environmental interests 
implicated by Next Generation cases. 
A. An Assessment of Existing Reform Proposals 
In Part III.D, we briefly discussed one reform that some scholars have 
advocated: interpreting the GATT Article XX exceptions as applicable to 
non-GATT agreements, on account of the latter being lex specialis.282 Such 
a move would most likely occur through a WTO Appellate Body decision. 
Another approach would be for WTO members themselves to reform the 
law through negotiations. 
Before elaborating on such proposals, it should be noted, at the outset, 
that not everyone agrees further legal reforms are necessary or even 
warranted. The standard view of the multilateral trading system is that it 
exists to facilitate the creation of “reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade.”283 This, in turn, raises living standards through welfare 
gains from trade. At its core, the system depends on the principles of 
reciprocity and nondiscrimination. When these principles are violated, even 
in the name of environmental protection, the regime should crack down on 
violators. Otherwise, protectionism in the name of the environment 
becomes too easy and undermines the trading system. 
For those who embrace this view, the disappearance of a balancing test 
in many of the Next Generation disputes is not necessarily troubling. 
Certain violations, such as subsidies with local-content requirements, 
should be illegal per se because they always violate the core principles and 
open the door to protectionism. This was the standard “free trader” 
response to the first Tuna/Dolphin case back in the 1990s.284 
 
2010); Rubini, supra note 14; Thomas Cottier et al., Energy in WTO Law and Policy (NCCR Trade 
Regulation, Working Paper No. 2009/25, 2009). 
282 See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
283 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
284 See, e.g., HUNTER ET AL., supra note 36, at 1206; Winfried Lang, WTO Dispute Settlement: 
What the Future Holds (1996), reprinted in HUNTER ET AL., supra note 36, at 1219, 1219–20. 
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Those who advocate reform tend to focus on the trade regime’s 
obligation to promote both standards of living and sustainable 
development, though from two different perspectives. The first is a legalist 
view that the (re-)creation of some form of an environmental exception is 
necessary to correct market failures. Government regulators must be given 
the scope to provide the proper incentives for remedying public externality 
problems. This group has largely pushed for an environmental “safe 
harbor” for certain subsidies. The tilt toward trade interests in Next 
Generation cases is due, in part, to the absence of an environmental 
exception in the SCM Agreement comparable to GATT Article XX. This 
was not always the case. The SCM Agreement originally included an 
exempt category of “non-actionable” (or “green light”) subsidies 
containing certain environmental subsidies.285 However, this category 
expired on January 1, 2000, and was not renewed.286 Over the past decade, 
several scholars have championed for its reintroduction, with most favoring 
a broadening of the scope of permissible environmental subsidies.287 
 
285 This included research and development (R&D) subsidies and subsidies “to promote adaptation 
of existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or regulations which result 
in greater constraints and financial burden on firms.” SCM Agreement, supra note 91, art. 8 (footnote 
omitted). 
286 See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
287 In 2005, Aguayo Ayala and Gallagher proposed that the SCM Agreement should contain a 
nonactionable “green light” category for subsidies which help “foster the shift toward cleaner 
production alternatives” as well as “payment for environmental services” performed by rural 
communities in developing countries. FRANCISCO AGUAYO AYALA & KEVIN P. GALLAGHER, 
PRESERVING POLICY SPACE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 2–3 (2005). In 2006, Green proposed 
replacing the original nonactionable category, which he also viewed as too narrow, with a “broadly 
defined” exception for subsidies related to environmental protection. Subsidies which fell under this 
broader exception would be subject to a necessity or least-restrictive-means test as well as a test along 
the lines of the GATT Article XX chapeau. Green, supra note 281, at 408–10. 
Howse has argued that the safe harbor of “non-actionab[le]” subsidies could be revived with the 
following changes: permissible subsidies should be tied to policies listed in a multilateral agreement 
(for example, the Kyoto Protocol’s successor), “contribute to the goals of the Kyoto Protocol” (based on 
“available evidence and sound scientific and economic principles”), and be consistent with the 
principles of nondiscrimination and transparency. HOWSE, supra note 269, at 21. Epps and Green, 
however, have subsequently claimed that Howse’s proposal may be politically infeasible. In their book, 
they advance Green’s earlier proposal for inclusion of a broad environmental exception for subsidies. 
They clarify that the safe harbor should be for subsidies designed “to encourage and provide incentives 
for certain actions” and “to encourage other aspects (such as implementation of new technology) where 
first-best instruments such as pricing are not politically feasible.” Moreover, they go a step further and 
suggest that countries include a schedule for environmental subsidies, which would then be reduced, 
along the lines of what is done in the Agreement on Agriculture. TRACEY EPPS & ANDREW GREEN, 
RECONCILING TRADE AND CLIMATE 256–57 (2010). More recently, Rubini has also suggested that legal 
reforms be carried out to legitimate certain environmental subsidies, with criteria modeled upon the 
EU’s state aid scheme. Rubini, supra note 14, at 570–77. 
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Despite a mandate coming out of the Doha Ministerial to entertain such 
proposals,288 little headway has been made in the negotiations. 
The second perspective is an instrumentalist view that what matters in 
trade law are not legal exceptions or balancing tests but, rather, the actual 
tariff lines and schedules for environmental goods. At the end of the day, 
this group argues, trade law fosters environmental progress when it 
facilitates the global flow of environmental goods at low tariff rates.289 
Thus, this camp pushes for the reduction of tariff rates on environmental 
goods through a sector-based agreement. How would this be 
accomplished? The WTO permits the negotiation of stand-alone, sector-
specific treaties for which countries can opt in. An example often held up 
as a model is the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), which 
lowered tariffs on a series of information technology goods (e.g., 
electronics and semiconductors).290 The idea is to negotiate a similar treaty 
for environmental goods, i.e., a Clean Technology Agreement. The Doha 
Ministerial Declaration explicitly called for such negotiations,291 and in 
recent years the idea has gained renewed traction among academics.292 
However, little headway has been made in such negotiations; countries 
continue to disagree on the most basic question of what qualifies as an 
environmental good.293 
The “environmental safe harbor” approach and the “Clean Technology 
Agreement” approach are not mutually exclusive. Both predate the Next 
 
288 During the Doha Ministerial, WTO members agreed to language stating they would entertain 
proposals for the reintroduction of an exempt category of “green light” subsidies in the SCM 
Agreement. That language made specific reference to subsidies with “legitimate development goals,” 
such as support for “development and implementation of environmentally sound methods of 
production.” See WTO, Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, Decision of 14 November 2001, 
¶ 10.2, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/17 (Nov. 20, 2001), 41 I.L.M. 757 (2002). 
289 See, e.g., EPPS & GREEN, supra note 287, at 235–36; WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE 73–95 (2008); WTO-UNEP, TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 80–83 (2009). 
290 See WTO, Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products, 
WT/MIN(96)/16 (Dec. 13,1996), 36 I.L.M. 375, 383 (1997). 
291 WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 31(iii), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 
2001), 41 I.L.M. 746, 751 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration] (calling for “the reduction or, as 
appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services”). 
292 See, e.g., Matthew J. Slaughter, Op-Ed., How to Avoid a Wind and Solar Trade War, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 13, 2012, at A13. Some have gone even further and called for such a treaty to address services 
and/or nontariff barriers as well. See, e.g., ARUNABHA GHOSH WITH HIMANI GANGANIA, GOVERNING 
CLEAN ENERGY SUBSIDIES: WHAT, WHY, AND HOW LEGAL? 43 (2012); Cottier et al., supra note 281; 
Robert Howse & Petrus B. van Bork, Options for Liberalising Trade in Environmental Goods in the 
Doha Round 21 (ICTSD Issue Paper No. 2, 2006). 
293 As of September 2010, six different proposals have been submitted by various sets of WTO 
members which cover over 500 different products. However, the amount of overlap between these 
proposals is not high, with only seven goods making their way onto at least four proposals. See Vesile 
Kulaçoğlu, Contribution of Trade Opening to Access to Climate-Friendly Goods and Services, 
Presentation to WTO Side Event at COP 16, 19–21 (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e
/envir_e/wksp10_climate_change_e/cancun_side_event_goods_e.ppt. 
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Generation cases, but each is enjoying renewed interest in light of the 
recent disputes. Yet, the rise of green industrial policy diminishes the 
likelihood of success of either approach. 
As emerging powers embrace green industrial policies, the odds that 
all parties can agree on the scope of an exemption decreases. Developed 
countries have become increasingly wary of a broadly worded 
environmental safe harbor, fearing it would limit their ability to take action 
against protectionist measures cloaked in green garb. Moreover, as labor 
unions recognize the utility of unilateral trade remedies cases, they will 
place increasing political pressure on governments not to circumscribe their 
ability to bring CVD cases by agreeing to any form of a safe harbor. 
Meanwhile, Chinese and Indian negotiators face the opposite pressure. If 
they agree to too narrow of a safe harbor provision that does not cover 
some of their own subsidies policies, they will face political criticism for 
having given their trading partners a legal exception without having 
secured one for their own policies. Within their polity, these policies are 
viewed not as trade distortionary, but as necessary for ensuring their 
country’s sustainable development. 
In addition, the rise of green industrial policies also negatively impacts 
the negotiation of a Clean Technology Agreement. Such policies have 
increased the competitiveness of developing countries in “core” goods.294 
As a result, industrialized countries have sought to expand the deal to 
include “non-core” environmental goods,295 but most developing countries 
are suspicious. They consider the industrialized countries’ proposal a 
backdoor ploy to gain concessions for industrial goods rather than 
motivated by any true environmental concern.296 Meanwhile, developing 
countries continue to demand special treatment, technology transfer, and 
financial assistance.297 Developed countries remain wary of such demands, 
 
294 For example, China now dominates the market for solar panels. See Kevin Bullis, The Chinese 
Solar Machine, MIT TECH. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 46; Stephen Lacey, How China Dominates Solar 
Power, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2011, 9:10 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/sep/12/
how-china-dominates-solar-power. 
295 For example, hybrid cars and energy-saving elevators are among the products listed in proposals 
put forth by developed countries. For a summary list of the products advanced in such proposals, see 
WTO Comm. on Trade & Env’t, Special Session, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Manuel A.J. 
Teehankee, to the Trade Negotiations Committee for the Purpose of the TNC Stocktaking Exercise, 
TN/TE/19 (Mar. 22, 2010). 
296 An Indian trade official asked why, if the broad list of environmentally preferable goods is truly 
meant to be inclusive, do developed countries resist including on the list of noncore goods items such as 
seed varieties that use less energy and are less carbon intensive, but which benefit primarily producers 
in developing, rather than industrialized, countries? Interview with Indian Government Official (2012-
G1). 
297 See INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., LIBERALIZATION OF CLIMATE-FRIENDLY 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS: ISSUES FOR SMALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2009); Mahesh Sugathan, 
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especially when they may be coupled with green industrial policies. In 
addition, developed and developing countries continue to disagree over 
how to implement tariff reductions. The odds of any agreement diminish as 
the effects of green industrial policies take hold. 
B. Do Environmental Interests Really Lose in Next Generation 
WTO Cases? 
If neither of the commonly espoused reform proposals is feasible, then 
what are the practical implications? Just how costly is the failure to reform 
WTO law to accommodate environmental measures in the Next Generation 
cases? A WTO ruling against a green industrial policy triggers a welfare 
gain, by requiring that a rent-seeking protectionist policy be eliminated. 
But it may also trigger a welfare loss, by requiring concurrent abandonment 
of a welfare-positive environmental policy. The importance of reform turns 
on one’s assumptions about the size of the former versus the latter. 
In this section, we argue that the expected welfare loss to the 
environment from unfavorable WTO rulings is likely to be much lower 
than feared. The explanation for this surprising result lies in the severable 
nature of the challenged green industrial policies. In the Classic disputes, 
the protectionist element is integral to the success and efficacy of the pro-
environmental policy. Without the alleged discriminatory element—market 
access restriction—the environmental policy loses much of its teeth. To 
hold that the United States cannot ban shrimp imports on the basis of how 
they are caught or that the EU cannot impose different taxes on flights on 
the basis of their carbon emissions eliminates the very purpose of the 
policy. While the Classic cases may permit the use of less-trade-restrictive 
alternatives, the positive environmental impact is often seriously reduced 
with the substitution of the alternative instrument.298 Ruling against the 
protectionist element in Classic cases therefore deals a serious blow to the 
pro-environmental interest. 
This is much less likely in the Next Generation disputes. In most of 
these disputes, the protectionist element of the policy is not integral to the 
implementation of the pro-environmental policy. Canada, Greece, Italy, or 
India could implement a feed-in-tariff regime without local-content 
requirements, as Germany and others have done.299 Similarly, China or the 
United States could restructure and scale back its solar subsidies to 
 
WTO Negotiations on Environmental Goods: Ensuring a Meaningful Outcome for Developing 
Countries, 1 INT’L TRADE F. 32 (2010), available at http://www.tradeforum.org/WTO-Negotiations-on-
Environmental-Goods-Ensuring-a-Meaningful-Outcome-for-Developing-Countries. 
298 For example, the Classic cases have endorsed the use of labeling requirements as a permissible 
alternative to an import ban. But the environmental impact of a label is much lower than that of an 
outright ban. See James Salzman, Informing the Green Consumer: The Debate over the Use and Abuse 
of Environmental Labels, J. INDUS. ECOLOGY, Apr. 1997, at 11. 
299 See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
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minimize the adverse effect on foreign producers. And China could 
implement a production quota or tax, rather than an export quota or tax, to 
limit the environmental harm caused by extracting minerals. In other 
words, in the Next Generation cases, one can preserve the environmental 
benefits of a policy while discarding its protectionist harms. 
A country whose green industrial policy is found to have violated 
WTO rules has one of three options: First, it can sever the trade-
problematic, industrial policy element but continue with the rest of the pro-
environmental policy. Second, it can try to find another way to retain both 
the industrial policy objectives and the environmental objectives of its 
policy by looking for another mechanism to implement its policy that is in 
compliance with its trade obligations. This can be achieved by identifying 
potential inconsistencies and/or loopholes in facets of WTO law. Granted, 
this alternative may be less effective or politically difficult to implement, 
which is why it was not pursued in the first place. However, it may provide 
a second-best alternative. Third, it can drop the offending policy altogether, 
with both the trade-problematic, industrial policy element and the 
environmentally favorable element disappearing. Any of these three 
options will bring the country in line with its WTO obligations. Trade law 
does not require, or favor, any one of these options.300 
Note that from the offending government’s standpoint, none of the 
three compliance options was preferable to the trade-illegal policy. Each 
results in higher fiscal costs and/or lower benefits for its domestic industrial 
sectors. But with the threat of retaliatory sanctions now imminent, 
governments must decide whether they are willing to bear the additional 
cost of sacrificing another sector’s interests for the sake of maintaining 
their green industrial policy.301 To date, most governments, given their 
political economy constraints, are not willing to do so. Instead, they have 
been forced to choose between the second-best alternatives in order to 
avoid trade sanctions. 
To illustrate, consider a case where the WTO declares Country A’s 
pro-environmental local-content subsidy illegal. The sector enjoying the 
subsidies will lobby against trimming them, but other sectors against whom 
retaliatory sanctions are threatened will lobby for the government to bring 
its subsidy policy into compliance to avoid being hurt. The government of 
the losing country faces three basic options: First, it can sever and drop the 
local-content requirement but continue providing the subsidy. This option 
sacrifices the industrial policy objective, but preserves the environmental 
 
300 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, supra note 156, 
art. 19 (footnote omitted) (noting that the panel or Appellate Body “may” but is not required to “suggest 
ways in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations” that “the Member 
concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement”). 
301 If the government does not drop the offending policy “within a reasonable period of time,” 
WTO rules allow the complainant to suspend concessions. Id. art. 22. 
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objective. Second, it can find a legal work-around solution. For example, 
the country may have fewer obligations for government procurement than 
subsidies; thus, it might shift away from using local-content subsidies 
toward using tendering procedures to benefit domestic producers in nascent 
renewable energy industries.302 This option requires Country A to maintain 
its environmental objective without sacrificing its industrial policy. Third, 
it can drop the offending policy altogether. Both the industrial policy and 
environmental objectives are sacrificed. 
 
Options for a WTO Member Following a Ruling 
Declaring a Green Industrial Policy Measure Illegal 
Does the Environment 
Still Benefit? 
1) Sever the industrial policy element but retain the 
overall environmental policy Yes 
2) Find a (second-best) alternative that retains both 
the industrial policy and the environmental 
objectives 
Yes 
3) Drop the entire policy, including both the 
industrial policy and the environmental elements No 
 
If we consider these three potential scenarios, it is important to 
recognize that only the third of these results in an environmentally negative 
outcome. Under both the first and second scenarios, the environmental 
benefits remain. The key question, then, is just how often will we see the 
third scenario emerge? 
We suggest that the answer turns on a small set of factors. The first is 
whether a legal work-around solution exists. If not, then Option 2 is 
foreclosed. If so, then two additional considerations are the relative 
differences in cost and execution difficulty of the work-around solution. 
Presumably, both are higher, but the relevant question is the marginal 
difference of Option 2 as compared to Options 1 and/or 3. The second is 
the extent that the industrial policy has already accomplished its objectives 
or been judged an outright failure, in which case the policymakers may be 
more willing to abandon it. The fiscal position of the government also 
matters. Those facing tighter fiscal constraints would be more inclined to 
jettison costly environmental programs without offsetting economic gains. 
Finally, overall political economy considerations—the relative political 
 
302 For example, South Africa requires that bidders for the Department of Energy’s Independent 
Power Producer (IPP) Procurement Programme for Renewable Energy Projects adhere to certain local-
content requirements; this was set at 28.5% for the first set of tenders for solar photovoltaics and 47.5% 
for the second set. See DELOITTE, THE MILLION JOBS QUESTION: LOCALISATION FOR RENEWABLES IN 
AFRICA 9 (2012). 
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strength and influence of the competing interest groups affected under each 
scenario—will clearly factor into the policymakers’ decision calculus. 
With these factors in mind, let us consider what has actually occurred 
in the Next Generation disputes decided to date. In China-Wind Power 
Equipment, China assumed the role of Country A, providing local-content 
subsidies to wind turbine manufacturers. After the United States filed its 
WTO case, China agreed to a settlement whereby it simply dropped the 
local-content requirement (i.e., Option 1).303 The subsidies continue, only 
now they take the form of a feed-in tariff and are available regardless of 
whether the local-content requirement is met.304 Although trade interests 
prevailed, the environmental benefits of large-scale wind power 
manufacturing continued. 
What motivated China’s actions? China’s decision was driven 
primarily by the success of its industrial policy. Between 2006 and 2009, 
China more than doubled its wind turbine installations each year.305 The 
industrial policy, coupled with high demand, caused several foreign 
manufacturers to relocate their production to China and strengthened 
China’s domestic production capabilities.306 By 2010, China had overtaken 
the United States to become the global leader in wind capacity.307 China 
could afford to drop the local-content requirement, confident that its 
domestic producers had become world-class leaders, thanks to its industrial 
policy. 
In China-Raw Materials, where the WTO declared China’s export 
restrictions on raw materials to be illegal, China again faces three 
options.308 The most obvious is to shift toward a production tax or quota. 
This retains the environmental benefit, while eliminating the trade 
distortion (Option 1). A second option is to remove the illegal tax and 
quota and replace them instead with an export licensing scheme which is 
permitted under WTO law. The licensing scheme, while not officially 
 
303 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 165. 
304 Paul Gipe, China Launches Differentiated Wind Energy Tariffs, 
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/
article/2009/09/china-launches-differentiated-wind-energy-tariffs. 
305 WORLD WIND ENERGY ASS’N, WORLD WIND ENERGY REPORT 2010, at 14 (2011). 
306 Doug L. Hoffman, Wind Turbine Industry Collapsing, Green Jobs Flee to China, RESILIENT 
EARTH (Oct. 7, 2012, 4:18 PM), http://theresilientearth.com/?q=content/wind-turbine-industry-
collapsing-green-jobs-flee-china; see also Tim Webb, Closure of Turbine Factory Takes the Wind out 
of Britain’s Low-Carbon Sails, GUARDIAN, April 29, 2009, at 25 (describing closure of British plant 
with jobs shifted to China and the U.S.). 
307 China World’s No. 1 in Installed Wind Power Capacity, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Jan. 14, 
2011, 9:24 AM) http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90860/7260858.html. China is 
expected to continue as the world’s leader for the remainder of the decade. Tildy Bayar, Despite 
Slowdown, China to Hold Wind Power Market Leadership to 2020, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM 
(Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2013/08/despite-slowdown-
china-to-hold-wind-power-market-leadership-to-2020. 
308 See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text. 
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limiting exports, would allow China to control the pace of exportation; it 
therefore provides a legal work-around for China to maintain both its 
industrial policy and environmental objectives (Option 2). A third option, 
favored by foreign businesses, is to eliminate the export restrictions 
altogether, without imposing any production restrictions (Option 3). But 
this would result in the most environmental degradation because of the 
higher volumes of mining. 
Of these three options, China appears to be most closely considering 
the second.309 This makes sense, because it allows China to best preserve its 
full range of policy objectives. This industrial policy, unlike the wind 
subsidies, was not designed to advantage and accelerate the growth of a 
single industry, and was instead meant to benefit a range of Chinese 
industries. So long as Chinese government guidance to a consolidated 
industry does not rise to the level of a de facto export restriction, Option 2 
appears to be a viable work-around. But even if it is not, Option 1 
(production tax or quota alone) is still likely more attractive than Option 3 
(no restrictions). It provides policy levers for the government to control the 
strategic outflow of mineral resources and environmental degradation in a 
way that Option 3 does not. 
Do other countries behave differently than China? Our analysis 
suggests they do not. Subsequent to the WTO ruling against Canada, 
Ontario announced that it would amend its feed-in-tariff program to drop 
the illegal local-content requirement (Option 1). Having already 
accomplished its industrial policy objective of securing investments and 
jobs, Ontario’s Energy Minister expressed confidence that Ontario’s clean 
energy manufacturing sector would remain resilient, despite the policy 
change.310 Again, like China-Wind Power Equipment, the WTO ruling 
resulted in a victory for trade interests, but not at the expense of the 
environment. 
Meanwhile, India is monitoring the Canada-Renewable Energy case 
closely because of similarities between its own program and Ontario’s. One 
high-level Indian trade official remarked that, were the local-content 
requirements of India’s program found illegal, it is highly unlikely that 
India would abandon the program altogether.311 Instead, India would also 
seek an alternative, WTO-compliant, work-around solution (Option 2). 
Already, India’s lawyers are exploring such alternatives, even before a 
WTO challenge has been filed against it. Potential replacement solutions, 
 
309 China Cites Compliance with WTO Raw Materials Ruling, METAL BULL. (Jan. 31, 2013, 
10:45 AM), http://www.metalbulletin.com/Article/3147874/China-cites-compliance-with-WTO-raw-
materials-ruling.html. 
310 Ontario to Change Green Energy Law After WTO Ruling, GLOBE & MAIL (May 29, 2013, 
4:23 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/
ontario-to-change-green-energy-law-after-wto-ruling/article12236781. 
311 Interview with Indian Government Official (2012-G1), supra note 296. 
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in the event that the local-content requirement must be abandoned, include 
using WTO-consistent investment requirements or government 
procurement rules to continue fostering the development of the domestic 
solar industry. 
Finally, in the ongoing China-Rare Earths case, China also began 
exploring an alternative, WTO-compliant, work-around solution (Option 2) 
before a negative ruling was issued against it. The eventual work-around 
solution will likely involve concentrating production in a handful of firms 
that can informally advantage domestic downstream producers.312 Again, 
even if a work-around solution proves untenable, China would likely still 
prefer a production restriction (Option 1) that severs the industrial policy 
component from the environmental component than an all-out 
abandonment of any restrictions on rare earths (Option 3) that results in 
greater environment harm. 
In all of these cases, even if the defendant loses and the trade interests 
prevail (as most of the defendants expect will be the case, given the current 
state of the law), it is not at all clear that the WTO rulings will result in 
negative environmental consequences. In no instance do we see any signs 
that governments will abandon the pro-environmental policy altogether 
(Option 3) as a result of losing their cases. Instead, because of flexibility in 
other areas of WTO law, governments can find ways to implement the pro-
environmental industrial policies through alternative channels. From the 
government’s perspective, these work-around solutions may be second-best 
policies, with higher political difficulty of implementation and/or less 
effective results. But from an environmentalist’s perspective, the 
environmental benefits are largely preserved, despite the original WTO-
violating policy being abandoned. 
The only instance where environmental interests clearly lose is Option 
3, where the losing party in a WTO dispute abandons the policy altogether, 
jettisoning both the protectionist industrial policy element as well as its 
associated pro-environmental element. We suggest that this is most likely 
to be the case when an alternative legal work-around is not available, the 
policy itself is costly, governments face fiscal constraints, the industrial 
policy to date has been unsuccessful, and the major beneficiaries of a trade-
compliant policy would be foreign producers. While such a situation is 
theoretically possible and may occasionally surface, our interviews with 
trade and environment policymakers suggest that it will be infrequent. To 
date, no government has taken such an approach in order to comply after 
losing a WTO trade and environment case. 
While counterintuitive, a ruling against a green industrial policy in a 
Next Generation dispute is not likely to be environmentally harmful. 
Because the environmental and protectionist measures are severable, Next 
 
312 Keith Bradsher, China Consolidates Grip on Rare Earths, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2011, at B1. 
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Generation disputes are dramatically different than Classic cases. In a Next 
Generation dispute, a country can comply with a WTO ruling by simply 
eliminating the protectionist element of the policy or altering it to become 
WTO compliant, while leaving the pro-environmental elements in place. 
To date, governments have done just that. Thus, even though the existing 
state of the WTO law governing the Next Generation disputes may be 
unfavorable to environmental interests, the environmental harm from such 
cases has been much less than commonly feared. 
C. But Unilateral Trade Remedies Cases Can Be 
Environmentally Harmful 
Despite the surprisingly optimistic finding in the preceding section 
that green industrial policies challenged at the WTO are unlikely to place 
environmental benefits at risk, there is an important caveat to our analysis. 
One of the key implications highlighted in Part III is that Next Generation 
cases may be adjudicated in multiple fora. They need not take the exclusive 
form of WTO litigation, but may also surface through unilateral trade 
remedies proceedings. Five of the ongoing Next Generation disputes that 
we have discussed so far—the U.S. petition against Chinese solar panels; 
the EU petition against Chinese solar panels; the Chinese petition filed 
against U.S. and Korean polysilicon; the Indian petition against U.S., 
Chinese, Malaysian, and Taiwanese solar panels; and the U.S. petition 
against Chinese and Vietnamese wind turbines—fall squarely into this 
category. 
Trade remedies cases differ dramatically from multilateral WTO cases 
in that they do not require that a losing party bring its policies into 
compliance with WTO law. Instead, if the complainant prevails, the 
government simply imposes higher tariffs unilaterally against the losing 
party until it can be shown that the injury caused by the dumping and/or 
subsidization no longer exists. 
As a result, the options that a losing party has in a trade remedies case 
are dramatically different. It can: 
(1) accept the increased tariff and pay it, while passing on some, if not all, 
of the cost to downstream consumers; 
(2) stop exporting the product to the country imposing the unilateral tariffs 
in order to avoid paying the increased tariff; 
(3) try to raise the price of its products so that it is no longer found to be 
“dumping” or injuring domestic competitors as a result of the subsidies 
received;313 or 
 
313 Note that in the instance of subsidies, theoretically, the losing party could also lobby the 
government to eliminate the subsidies, but this does not happen as it would be against the party’s 
interest. Article 19.4 of the SCM Agreement prevents the levying of a CVD “in excess of the amount of 
the subsidy found,” so there is unlikely to be a scenario in which the cost of the CVD will exceed the 
benefit of the subsidy for the party receiving the subsidy. See SCM Agreement, supra note 91, art. 19.4. 
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(4) move production to a costlier location elsewhere to avoid the increased 
tariff, while passing on some, if not all, of the increased cost to 
downstream consumers. 
Unlike the options available under the multilateral WTO dispute 
settlement channel, all four of these options are environmentally harmful. 
The first, third, and fourth options result in higher prices for environmental 
goods. The second option results in decreased consumer choice for lower 
priced environmental goods. All will result in slower consumer uptake of 
renewable energy products, with the exact impact depending on the 
consumer elasticity for the good. 
One might think that the solution is to lower tariffs on environmental 
goods, so as to offset the tariff increases associated with unilateral trade 
remedies. Following the U.S. decision to impose unilateral antidumping 
duties on Chinese solar panels, several individuals responded with a call to 
reform WTO law by negotiating a Clean Technology Agreement.314 But 
this misses the point. Adoption of a sector-based environmental goods 
agreement has absolutely no bearing on the level of environmental harm 
stemming from unilateral trade remedies. 
To illustrate this point, suppose current U.S. tariffs on solar panels are 
set at 10%. A new Clean Technology Agreement is reached and entirely 
eliminates tariffs on solar panels. Without any unilateral trade remedies, 
this decrease in tariff levels by 10% is environmentally favorable, 
increasing access to and competition among environmental goods. 
Following an antidumping or CVD ruling, however, the adjudicator 
determines the absolute tariff level necessary to offset the injury from the 
harm caused by the dumping or subsidization. Suppose that the adjudicator 
determined that the tariff level required to remedy the injury was 250% (as 
the U.S. Department of Commerce recently ruled regarding the Chinese 
solar panels).315 Regardless of whether a Clean Technology Agreement is in 
place or not, we arrive at the same outcome—a tariff of 250% on Chinese 
solar panels. Thus, the existence of a Clean Technology Agreement only 
alters the amount of the marginal increase (240% versus 250%); the 
absolute tariff is the same under either scenario. 
In most other instances outside of the environmental context, when 
faced with increased tariffs due to trade remedies, the losing party has 
moved production or simply paid the higher tariff and then passed on a 
percentage (if not most) of the cost increase to consumers. Reports suggest 
that this will also be the case with the Chinese solar panel manufacturers, 
who to date have been the only losing party in such an environmental trade 
dispute. This, in turn, will raise the cost of solar panel installations for 
 
314 See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 292; cf. MATTHEW STEPP & ROBERT D. ATKINSON, GREEN 
MERCANTILISM: THREAT TO THE CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY 21 (2012). 
315 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
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American consumers and slow the rate of solar power adoption by 
American households.316 
Thus, the forum for Next Generation disputes matters significantly. If 
the dispute is adjudicated through multilateral dispute settlement, then the 
losing party has several options to comply with the WTO ruling. The two 
most favored policy options to date also preserve the environmental 
benefits of the illegal industrial policy. In contrast, if the dispute takes the 
form of a trade remedies case to be adjudicated in domestic administrative 
courts, then all of the options available to the losing party will result in 
some form of harm to environmental interests—either through higher 
prices or decreased consumer choice of low-cost environmental goods. 
D. Pro-environmental Reform Proposals for Trade Remedies 
If environmentalists are serious about potential harm from the rising 
tide of Next Generation cases, then they need to focus on trade remedies 
cases. We offer a series of four proposals below for consideration. As far as 
we are aware, such proposals have not been brought forward nor have they 
been discussed in the WTO Rules negotiations. 
Before discussing our proposals, we note that one obvious solution 
would be to require WTO members to agree to submit all disputes on 
environmental goods through the multilateral WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. In essence, countries would agree on a temporary ceasefire on 
the use of unilateral trade remedies against each other. In other areas of 
international trade, WTO members have agreed to similar ceasefire 
arrangements through implementation of a “peace clause” in the 
agreements.317 Regardless of whether one is sympathetic to such an idea, 
we think that it is politically unrealistic. The United States and several 
other countries are determined to maintain the option of unilateral trade 
remedies.318 Trade remedies offer a much faster, more direct, and more 
politically popular means of response to unfair industrial policies compared 
to WTO disputes. This is important to governments concerned that Chinese 
 
316 Steven Cohen, Stop the Solar Trade War, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19, 2011, 8:41 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-cohen/stop-the-solar-trade-war_b_1157573.html (“[G]etting into 
a trade war with China will probably increase the price of solar power in the short term. This price rise 
would take place at the worst possible time . . . . If your goal was to kill solar power in the United 
States, this might be a good way to start.”); Martin Green, A Solar Trade War Could Put Us All in the 
Dark, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/426392/a-solar-trade-
war-could-put-us-all-in-the-dark. 
317 E.g., Agreement on Agriculture art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410. 
318 See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(a)(14) (2006) (“The principal 
negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to trade remedy laws are—(A) to preserve the 
ability of the United States to enforce rigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping, 
countervailing duty, and safeguard laws, and avoid agreements that lessen the effectiveness of domestic 
and international disciplines on unfair trade, especially dumping and subsidies . . . .”). 
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(and potentially others’) policies are quickly eroding the competitiveness of 
their domestic industries and determined to stop the outsourcing of 
manufacturing of renewable energy products. If a formal “peace clause” or 
an informal truce is not in the range of realistic possibilities, what are other 
solutions? 
The main cost of unilateral trade remedies from an environmental 
standpoint is the fact that they result in higher costs for the environmental 
good on which tariffs are imposed (e.g., solar panels), since a portion of the 
cost of higher tariffs is passed directly to consumers. Our first proposal 
seeks to address this cost directly. Governments, before imposing a trade 
remedy, could be required to undertake an economic analysis of the effect 
of the proposed tariff increase on prices. They would also estimate the 
amount of additional tariff revenue that the trade remedy would bring in. 
Based on this analysis, the government would designate a portion of the 
additional tariff revenue into a fund that provides rebates to consumers of 
the product on which a trade remedy has been imposed. Negotiators can 
decide whether the precise proportion should be calculated as a percentage 
of tariff revenue or of the expected price increase, and whether it is to be 
given prospectively or retrospectively. 
For example, suppose the American version of a solar panel cost 30% 
more than a Chinese version. Suppose also that a U.S. trade remedy case 
resulted in an additional 100% tariff imposed against Chinese imports. 
Assuming the entire cost of the punitive tariff is passed on to consumers, 
Chinese solar panels will now cost 54% more than American-made ones.319 
This benefits American manufacturers. But environmental interests are hurt 
by the trade remedy because the lowest priced alternative after the trade 
remedy is imposed is now 30% more expensive. Assuming some price 
elasticity in the demand curve, uptake of solar conversions is likely to slow. 
However, our proposal would require U.S. authorities to give some 
proportion of the increased tariff revenues from trade remedies back to 
consumers who buy solar panels manufactured by any country’s 
producer.320 Suppose after the economic analysis is performed, this rebate is 
set at 15% of the purchase price. Regardless of what countries’ panels they 
 
319 To illustrate this, assume the price of Chinese solar panels prior to the imposition of 
antidumping duties is $100. The price of the corresponding American solar panel would then be $130. 
Following the imposition of a 100% duty on Chinese panels, assuming the cost is passed on to 
consumers, the price of a Chinese panel is now $200 (i.e., $100 + (100% × $100)). Provided the 
American panel’s price remains the same, the Chinese panel is now 54% more expensive (i.e., ($200 –
 $130) / $130). 
320 To do otherwise would trigger a violation of the most-favored-nation and/or national treatment 
requirements. See GATT, supra note 12, arts. I, III. Note that the Appellate Body has previously found 
that duties collected from trade remedy measures cannot be redistributed to affected domestic 
producers. See Appellate Body, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 
WT/DS217/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003). The proposal therefore calls for the funds to be given to consumers 
in a scenario where they can continue to spend the funds on the imported product. 
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purchase (American, Chinese, or other), consumers are now eligible for a 
15% rebate. The environmental harm is mitigated, although not eliminated, 
as the lowest price alternative is now only slightly more than 10% more 
expensive than it was prior to the trade remedy. Assuming price is a major 
factor driving consumer purchases, consumption should shift away from 
Chinese imports toward American-made panels. The rebate, therefore, 
would mitigate environmental fallout while benefitting primarily domestic 
producers. 
This proposal allows for two competing goals to be met. On the one 
hand, as a result of the higher tariff, the foreign producer loses the cost 
advantage that it had over the domestic producer due to its allegedly unfair 
trade practice. If consumers continue to favor the foreign product, it is on 
account of nonprice factors (e.g., quality, design) rather than price 
advantages accruing from “dumping” or subsidization. On the other hand, 
consumers are not forced to bear the brunt of the cost of the trade remedy. 
A portion of the increased cost will be refunded directly to them, thanks to 
the rebate scheme. Unfair trade practice concerns are accommodated, while 
the negative environmental impact is mitigated. 
Unlike other reform proposals, we do not anticipate that ours will face 
serious political economy constraints. By raising demand, the rebate helps 
both domestic producers and downstream suppliers, two groups that have 
otherwise been at loggerheads in the trade remedies cases. In addition, both 
labor and environmental groups could support such a proposal; the rebates 
trigger more installation jobs and greater adoption of renewable 
technology. Moreover, the proposal is self-financing; funding for the 
rebates is based on projections of duties collected. 
A second possibility is to limit the number of trade remedies that may 
be applied to environmental goods simultaneously. For example, WTO 
members might agree on a decision that sets the limit at no more than three 
simultaneous trade remedy measures on environmental goods. This 
preserves the flexibility of countries to take action against dumping or 
unfair subsidization as they see fit. It also allows countries to retain the 
option to take action in truly harmful situations, involving predatory 
pricing.321 But it will prevent them from abusing this flexibility to enact a 
large swath of trade remedies simply for the sake of protecting domestic 
renewable energy industries by keeping prices of environmentally 
beneficial foreign products artificially high.322 In addition, with a cap, a 
government will need to carefully consider whether a particular case or 
 
321 Empirical analysis suggests that such instances are rare. See, e.g., PATRICK A. MESSERLIN, 
MEASURING THE COST OF PROTECTION IN EUROPE 354–59 (2001) (limited to less than 2% of EU 
cases). 
322 Such potential abuse is most prominent in the antidumping context, on account of its 
permissible calculation methodologies. See, e.g., BRINK LINDSEY & DANIEL J. IKENSON, ANTIDUMPING 
EXPOSED 19–24 (2003). 
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product is important enough for it to use up one of its allotments, instead of 
taking measures on close to every case filed by domestic producers. 
Finally, the cap will induce the sunset of certain long-standing trade 
remedies in order to make room for more recent ones. 
Indeed, one of the dangers of trade remedies is that the high tariff rates 
imposed from such cases are allowed to continue for long periods of time. 
WTO law places no limits on how long antidumping duties and CVDs can 
be maintained, so long as they are reviewed every five years and the 
investigating authorities determine that injury would result from their 
termination.323 The loose legal standard governing these sunset reviews 
allows for governments to maintain trade remedies for long periods. For 
example, the United States has antidumping duties dating back to the 
Reagan Administration,324 and the EU has antidumping measures dating 
back to 1990.325 
A third and related idea is to place a strict time limit on how long trade 
remedies may be maintained for environmental goods. For example, the 
WTO Safeguards Agreement allows for safeguards to be maintained for 
only three years before compensation must be paid.326 WTO members could 
decide to place a similar time limit on the imposition of trade remedies 
against environmental goods. This proposal recognizes the fact that in 
imposing a tariff following a trade remedies case, a government wants to 
grant its domestic industries sufficient time to recover from the effects of 
their competitor’s “dumping” or subsidization. However, setting a time 
limit ensures any environmental cost is limited to the near term. 
A fourth and final proposal is to place an upper bound on the size of 
the additional tariff that may be imposed in a trade remedies case. This is 
likely to be controversial because it runs against the principle that 
governments should always be allowed to impose trade remedies at a level 
high enough to sufficiently remedy the injury caused by the “dumping” or 
subsidization.327 This would prevent a sudden shock of the sort that is 
expected when solar panel prices rise sharply in the United States following 
the imposition of preliminary antidumping duties of up to 250%. Already, 
experts are forecasting a major decrease in new solar installations in the 
 
323 See supra note 182 and accompanying text; WTO Antidumping Agreement, supra note 273, 
art. 11. 
324 WTO Comm. on Anti-dumping Practices, Semi-annual Report Under Article 16.4 of the 
Agreement—United States, 46–53, G/ADP/N/223/USA (Apr. 3, 2012). 
325 WTO Comm. on Anti-dumping Practices, Semi-annual Report Under Article 16.4 of the 
Agreement—European Union, 20, G/ADP/N/223/EU (Apr. 20, 2012). 
326 Agreement on Safeguards art. 8, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154. 
327 See WTO Antidumping Agreement, supra note 273, art. 9.1; SCM Agreement, supra note 91, 
art. 19. 
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United States as an expected casualty of these unilateral tariffs.328 If the 
upper bound were set at 50%, for example, the impact of this shock would 
be lessened for the environment, but the strong message to Chinese 
manufacturers would still be clear. 
Any or all of these proposals can be implemented unilaterally or 
through a decision of the WTO itself, along the lines of the paragraph six 
solution to the TRIPS Agreement.329 Thus, a formal amendment to the 
WTO Agreement on Antidumping (ADA) or the SCM Agreement is not 
necessary, although the amendment process does represent an alternate 
means of implementation. 
Given the practical impediments that make other reform proposals 
difficult, why do we think that ours will fare any better? Every WTO 
member faces the threat that another country may employ trade remedies 
against its producers. Each recognizes that this behavior, left unchecked, 
can lead to a degenerative tit-for-tat trade war in which all sides would be 
hurt. Thus, each side benefits from proposals, such as those that we have 
advanced, that place limits on behavior and therefore decrease the odds of a 
trade war. However, none of the proposals require any WTO member to 
disarm. Each still retains the option of employing a trade remedy, if 
necessary, under certain circumstances. To use a nuclear weapons analogy, 
the proposal simply places limits on the number and types of warheads that 
each side may use, but does not ban them altogether. It is essentially an 
“arms control” agreement for preventing an environmental trade war that 
could infect other trade areas, too. The political cost of engaging in such an 
agreement is much lower than one that requires giving up some policy 
instrument permanently (such as tariffs in a Clean Technology Agreement 
or litigation with the reintroduction of an environmental exception in the 
SCM Agreement).330 
What about the feasibility of the proposals from a domestic political 
economy perspective? One might suppose that our proposals set up the 
classic trade policy scenario of pitting competitive export-oriented sectors 
against floundering domestic-oriented sectors. Certainly, this dynamic 
holds true in those countries where domestic renewable sectors have fallen 
behind and globally competitive exporters have yet to emerge in renewable 
energy (e.g., India). But it is not the dominant model, at least not yet. In the 
major trading powers (e.g., the United States, EU, China, Japan), the 
traditional dynamic has yet to take hold. Instead, the affected domestic 
industries harbor both offensive and defensive concerns—i.e., wanting their 
 
328 Paul Ausick, U.S. Solar Installations Will Drop in 2013, 24/7 WALL ST. (Sept. 10, 2012, 
12:49 PM), http://247wallst.com/2012/09/10/u-s-solar-installations-will-drop-in-2013-fslr-spwr-tsl-stp-
ldk-jaso-yge-csiq. 
329 WTO General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 1, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 509 (2004). 
330 See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
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government to ensure continued market entry abroad while maintaining 
flexibility to protect markets at home—and are enmeshed in complex 
supply chains. Thus, the industry sectors that are affected are more likely to 
be open to proposals that limit, but do not eliminate, the government’s 
ability to impose trade remedies. The domestic political economy cost of 
championing such proposals is likely to be much lower in this arena than it 
would be in others, such as agricultural goods, where the domestic 
divisions are more hardened.331 So long as the market dynamics remain 
fairly fluid, a window of opportunity for our reforms persists. 
If the environmental community is serious about trying to mitigate the 
negative impacts from Next Generation cases, then their focus should be on 
trade remedies. We have suggested four potential strategies to constrain the 
WTO rules governing trade remedies to prevent such cases from triggering 
a degenerative green trade war. Each has potential downsides, but 
additional constraints would go a long way toward preventing Next 
Generation trade remedies conflicts from undoing the progress made in 
advancing renewable energy solutions to our environmental problems. 
CONCLUSION 
A fundamental shift is occurring in the nature of cross-border conflicts 
implicating trade and environmental concerns. Yet, it is one that the public 
at large appears to be missing. While many assume that China, India, and 
other developing countries are dragging their feet on implementing 
environmental policies, these countries, along with some developed 
countries, are actually deploying traditional industrial policies to spark their 
renewable energy sectors and capture these nascent markets. Although the 
first-order motivation for these policies may be job creation and economic 
development, they are nevertheless positive for the environment. However, 
these policies have led to a series of trade conflicts because the instruments 
deployed to execute the industrial policy often violate WTO rules. By 
framing these recent conflicts within the conceptual category of Next 
Generation cases and highlighting the contrast with the Classic trade and 
environment cases, we have sought to shed light on the messier legal and 
political dynamics of these emergent cases. 
The Next Generation cases, at first glance, appear to trigger negative 
environmental consequences. They have threatened the pro-environmental 
coalition of the earlier Classic cases concerning endangered species and air 
 
331 Governments have needed to expend considerable political capital if they are to overcome the 
entrenched domestic opposition to trade concessions on agriculture. See, e.g., TIMOTHY JOSLING, 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICY: COMPLETING THE REFORM 2–3 (1998) (discussing this dynamic in the 
context of the Uruguay Round); ‘Sanctuary’ Safe in TPP Talks, Abe Assures the Diet, JAPAN TIMES 
(Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/10/17/business/sanctuary-safe-in-tpp-talks-abe
-assures-the-diet (discussing the significant challenges confronting Japan as it negotiates the Trans-
Pacific Partnership). 
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quality. Labor unions lobby hard against foreign pro-environmental 
industrial policies when they threaten to steal domestic jobs. Producer 
interests have split. Meanwhile, environmental groups have stayed largely 
silent. And the applicable law in many of these cases no longer even 
considers environmental interests. This is as true of the subsidies-related 
cases at the WTO as the trade remedies cases filed domestically. Under 
such circumstances, so long as the policy violates the trade discipline, it is 
deemed illegal, no matter how large or valid the competing environmental 
concern. Although many of these cases are still ongoing, the ones that have 
resulted in rulings so far have all been against the trade-problematic, but 
pro-environmental, policies. 
This broad shift in the dynamics of the trade and environment disputes 
has escaped the attention of many. For the few that have noticed, however, 
the shift has provoked alarm, leading to calls for legal reforms of WTO law 
to help mitigate the environmental fallout from the rulings against these 
pro-environmental policies. We have shown that this fear is overblown, at 
least with respect to WTO cases. In green industrial policy cases, unlike the 
earlier Classic cases, the environmental element is not at the core of the 
policy deemed illegal. Our analysis suggests that governments, in 
responding to these negative rulings, either find legal work-around 
solutions or sever only the quasi-protectionist elements, keeping the 
environmental benefits in place. Meanwhile, these rulings have welfare-
positive effects in that they lessen the rent-seeking behavior embedded 
within the industrial policy. Just because trade wins doesn’t mean that 
environment loses. 
At the same time, this trend is not true across the board. A very 
different dynamic is at work in domestic trade remedies cases that lead to 
the imposition of unilateral tariffs against environmental goods. Here, 
environmental interests lose due to the higher cost and/or lower consumer 
choice for environmental goods that result from such cases. As a result, 
efforts to reform legal rules to mitigate the environmental damage from the 
rise of green industrial policy disputes should focus on the narrow task of 
reforming the WTO’s trade remedies rules. 
In a world where climate change negotiations are faltering and a treaty 
seems a distant hope, green industrial policy has emerged as one of the 
most important areas for real progress. Litigation of this new class of trade 
and environment disputes and the rules shaping the race toward a 
renewable energy future have become an important part of the global 
climate regime. How these rules are determined will play an important role 
in charting the path toward a sustainable future. 
 
